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PRETRIAL DETENTION AND THE VALUE OF LIBERTY
Megan T. Stevenson* & Sandra G. Mayson**
How dangerous must a person be to justify the state in locking her up
for the greater good? The bail reform movement, which aspires to limit
pretrial detention to the truly dangerous—and which has looked to
algorithmic risk assessments to quantify danger—has brought this
question to the fore. Constitutional doctrine authorizes pretrial
detention when the government’s interest in safety “outweighs” an
individual’s interest in liberty, but it does not specify how to balance
these goods. If detaining ten presumptively innocent people for three
months is projected to prevent one robbery, is it worth it?
This Article confronts the question of what degree of risk justifies
pretrial preventive detention if one takes the consequentialist approach
of current law seriously. Surveying the law, we derive two principles:
1) detention must avert greater harm (by preventing crime) than it
inflicts (by depriving a person of liberty); and 2) prohibitions against
pretrial punishment mean that the harm experienced by the detainee
cannot be discounted in the cost-benefit calculus. With this conceptual
framework in place, we develop a novel empirical method for
estimating the relative personal cost of incarceration and crime
victimization that we call relative harm valuation: a survey method that
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asks respondents to choose between being the victim of certain crimes
or being jailed for varying time periods. The results suggest that even
short periods of incarceration impose grave harms, such that a person
must pose an extremely high risk of serious crime in order for detention
to be justified. No existing risk assessment tool is sufficient to identify
individuals who warrant detention. The results demonstrate that the
stated consequentialist rationale for pretrial detention cannot begin to
justify our current detention rates. They suggest that the existing system
is instead inflicting pretrial punishment, and they counsel a rethinking
of pretrial law and policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose we can avert an armed robbery by incarcerating ten people for
thirty days each. We do not know which of the ten would otherwise
commit the crime, and the incarceration is not justified as punishment. Is
it worth it? How many people should we be willing to lock up to prevent
one future crime?
“None!” you may answer, on the ground that the state may never lock
up any person solely to prevent future crime—at least not any person who
is a responsible agent with her cognitive faculties intact. We live in a
liberal democracy, not a dystopia.1 You may be forgiven; this view has
wide currency among thoughtful people.2
But your indignation runs counter to the facts and the law. Contrary to
common perception, preventive detention is not just the stuff of science
fiction. Governments of contemporary liberal democracies routinely
engage in preventive detention of many forms. Pretrial detention is one
type. Other types include juvenile detention, immigration detention, and
manifold variants of short- and long-term civil commitment.3 In each of
these fields, the government claims authority to deprive people of liberty
solely on the basis that custody is necessary to prevent a person from
committing future harm.4 The state makes no claim that the person to be
detained has forfeited her right to liberty or that the deprivation is
deserved. The detention is not punishment. Instead, the detention is
“regulatory.” The U.S. Supreme Court has long authorized such

1

See generally Minority Report (20th Century Fox 2002) (depicting dystopian future in
which future-criminals are incapacitated before they commit any crime).
2
See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventative Justice in the World of
John Mitchell, 56 Va. L. Rev. 371, 376–77 (1970) [hereinafter Tribe, An Ounce of Detention];
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 1329, 1370 (1971); see also infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (addressing this
perspective).
3
See infra notes 58–64 and accompanying text.
4
There are also forms of preventive detention that seek to avert unintentional rather than,
or in addition to, willful acts of harm. Examples include quarantine to prevent the spread of
communicable disease, as we know all too well, and jury sequestration. For discussions of the
law of jury sequestration, see, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 Am. J. Crim. L. 63
(1996); James P. Levine, The Impact of Sequestration on Juries, 79 Judicature 266 (1996).

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

712

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:709

practices.5 Indeed, it is hard to imagine functional governance without
them.
Nonetheless, preventive detention is terrifying. It does not adhere to
the central constraint on criminal punishment—that it may be imposed
only for a past wrongful act.6 The justification for preventive detention is
merely “risk,” and risk is amorphous. So the central question for any
preventive detention regime is what kind and degree of risk is sufficient
to justify the detention at issue. If we incarcerate people who have a 20%
chance of otherwise committing an assault during the period of detention,
for instance, we can expect to prevent one assault for every five
detentions. Is such detention justified? How much liberty should we
sacrifice to prevent one crime?
As is, there is nothing approaching a consensus answer to this
question.7 Courts and legislatures routinely assert the regulatory power of
the state to detain those who pose a great enough risk, but even in longstanding preventive detention regimes, the relevant legal standards are
vague at best.8 Generations of scholars have lamented the lack of legal
guidance. Few have offered specific guidance themselves.9 The problem
is that the question requires an explicit tradeoff between liberty and
security, values that are infrequently measured and difficult to compare.
Difficulties notwithstanding, the bail reform movement has now placed
the question of what risk justifies preventive detention squarely at center
stage.10 Jurisdictions around the country are forsaking money bail in favor
of more intentional decisions about pretrial custody. The new systems
aspire to detain those arrested persons who pose a true threat and release

5

See infra notes 34–43 and accompanying text.
See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 1, 23
(2d ed. 2008) (explaining how this constraint on punishment “maximizes individual freedom
within the coercive framework of law”); Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of
the Criminal Law (2008) (describing conceptual constraints on punishment).
7
See generally Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1 (2003) (urging scholars and courts to develop more coherent standards for preventive
deprivations of liberty).
8
See infra Section I.A.
9
See Alan Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventive Confinement in Anglo-American Law —
Part I: The English Experience, 43 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 60 (1974) (“We have not even begun to
ask these kinds of questions, or to develop modes of analysis for answering them.”).
10
See Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 Yale L.J. 490, 494 (2018) [hereinafter
Mayson, Dangerous Defendants] (“[Bail reform] holds great promise, but also raises an
extremely difficult question: what probability that a person will commit unspecified future
crime justifies detention . . . ?”).
6
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everyone else on appropriate conditions.11 Flight risk is also a concern in
the pretrial context, but a distinctly secondary one in practice.12 The
aspiration to limit detention to the dangerous requires each pretrial system
to decide what kind of threat justifies detention. The advent of statistical
risk assessment has crystallized the question further by forcing courts and
stakeholders to deal in quantified probabilities and to confront the limits
of prediction.13 Every jurisdiction that authorizes pretrial detention, and
every court that imposes it, must decide what degree of risk warrants
depriving a person of liberty.
This Article tackles the question of when pretrial detention is warranted
to prevent future crime.14 Whereas the great bulk of prior scholarship on
pretrial detention has focused on the shortcomings of current law,15 we
take existing law as a given. This is not to endorse existing law as
representing the best possible policy approach to detention. The project,
rather, is to take existing legal doctrine seriously and to ask when
detention meets the law’s criteria. We present a conceptual framework for
answering the question and then a novel empirical method for
implementing the framework.
The conceptual framework is a straightforward consequentialist one.
Constitutional law authorizes pretrial detention when the government’s
interest in safety “outweighs” the individual’s interest in liberty.16 On our
11
See Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People
from Jail, Explained, Vox (Oct. 17, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-inequality [https://perma.cc/V3Q
S-J69G].
12
Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 Yale L.J.
1344, 1351 (2014) (“Historically, the U.S. system of bail and associated pretrial detention was
employed solely to prevent pretrial flight, but increasingly, the many individuals awaiting trial
in jail are detained because a judge has deemed them potentially dangerous.”). For a thoughtful
discussion of the various kinds of risk, often lumped together as “flight risk,” see Lauryn P.
Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 677 (2018).
13
John Monahan & Eric Silver, Judicial Decision Thresholds for Violence Risk
Management, 2 Int’l J. of Forensic Mental Health 1, 6 (2003) (“The necessity for choosing a
decision threshold for risk management decisions, long implicit in clinical risk assessment, is
made apparent in actuarial prediction.”).
14
Cf. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 557–60 (reserving judgment on the
degree of risk that justifies preventive detention). This Article does not address the power of
courts to detain an accused person who has violated a court-imposed condition of release.
15
E.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of InterestBalancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 510 (1986); Chalmous G.
Reemes, United States v. Salerno: The Validation of Preventive Detention and the Denial of
a Presumed Constitutional Right to Bail, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 697, 719–22 (1988).
16
See infra notes 29–44 and accompanying text.
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reading, this doctrine establishes a simple cost-benefit framework.17 In
order to be justified in those terms, pretrial detention must, at minimum,
avert more harm than it inflicts. The most significant harms at stake are
the cost of crime to the potential crime victim and the cost of pretrial
detention to the detainee. Within this calculus, prohibitions against
pretrial punishment mean that the well-being of the arrestee must be fully
considered. The challenge is thus to develop a direct measure of the
relative harms of incarceration and crime.
To meet the challenge, the Article deploys a novel form of contingent
valuation that we call “relative harm valuation” (“RHV”).18 It aims to
estimate the relative harm of incarceration versus crime victimization
while avoiding some of the distortions that plague traditional cost-benefit
and contingent-valuation methods. Our method is intentionally simple,
and it echoes John Rawls’ famous notion that the principles of justice are
those that a rational person would choose behind a “veil of ignorance” as
to her own traits and position in society.19 Adapting his effort to detach
normative analysis from self-interest, we conduct a survey that requires
respondents to compare the costs of detention and crime directly,
imagining themselves as both detainee and as crime victim. We ask
questions like, “How much time in jail is as bad as being the victim of a
burglary?” and, “If you had to choose between spending a month in jail
or being the victim of a burglary, which would you choose?”20
The survey results suggest that people view incarceration as an
incredibly harmful experience. Most would choose crime-victimization
over even short jail stints. The median respondent says that a single day
in jail is as costly as a burglary, that three days are as costly as a robbery,
and that a month in jail is as costly as an aggravated assault. Notably,
17

See infra Section I.B.
We developed this concept and conducted our first study in 2017 but learned in the spring
of 2020 that others have used the same method in other contexts. Most notably, the legal
scholars Jane Bambauer and Andrea Roth have used a similar survey method to estimate when
carceral punishment becomes “excessive” for constitutional purposes. See infra note 119.
Conversations with Bambauer and Roth were valuable in refining our approach. We consider
the existence of these other efforts to be a strength of the present study rather than a weakness.
The other studies to have deployed RHV have also documented a surprising degree of aversion
to incarceration or involuntary commitment among a sizable portion of respondents. See infra
note 141.
19
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 118 (2d ed. 1999).
20
This method is a variant of the survey technique formally known as “contingent
valuation,” which has provided most of the commonly used estimates for the costs of crime.
See infra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
18
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these results are very consistent across race, gender, and socioeconomic
class of the respondent. They are also quite similar for those who have
personal experience with incarceration or crime victimization. Aversion
to incarceration is broad and widespread.
By focusing on costs to the crime victim and incarcerated person, our
method puts aside indirect and fiscal costs. However, we expect these to
accrue on both sides of the ledger. Crime can create fear in the
community, but so can incarceration. Law enforcement and prosecution
are expensive to the state, but so is incarceration. Including such costs
might make the analysis more nuanced, but we do not think it would
meaningfully change the main result: that even a short period of
incarceration inflicts very grave harms.
The severity of the harm that incarceration inflicts (according to our
median respondent) means that preventive detention can only be justified
on consequentialist grounds if there is a very high risk that the person
would otherwise commit serious crime. Jailing a person for thirty days is
justifiable only if it is expected to prevent crimes at least as harmful as a
serious assault. Jailing someone for just one day is justifiable only if it
averts crime as serious as burglary. These risk thresholds are higher than
we can meet with statistical evidence. In studies of one widely used risk
assessment tool, for instance, even defendants in the highest risk group
have only a 2.5% chance of rearrest for a violent offense within a month.21
We would have to detain forty such people for one month each, not just
one person, to expect to avert one violent offense.
Given the high risk-threshold for preventive detention and the limits of
our predictive abilities, pretrial detention on the basis of dangerousness
should be rare. But it is not. On any given day, almost 500,000 people are
held in jails awaiting trial.22 Many more cycle through pretrial detention
each year.23 A significant number of these detentions may be the
unintentional result of a court setting money bail that the accused cannot
afford.24 A much smaller number may be justified on the basis of flight
21

See Thomas Blomberg, William Bales, Karen Mann, Ryann Meldrum & Joe Nedelec,
Ctr. for Criminology and Pub. Pol’y Rsch., Validation of the COMPAS Risk Assessment
Classification Instrument 47 tbl.8 (2010).
22
Zhen Zeng, Bureau of Just. Stat., Jail Inmates in 2017, 1 fig.1, 5 tbl.3 (2019),
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji17.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPM3-NP84].
23
Id. at 1.
24
E.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, 69 Duke L.J. 1643, 1653 (2020)
[hereinafter Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name] (citing statistics regarding detention on
money bail).
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risk—a ground for detention that this paper does not address.25 Yet the
centrality of public-safety discourse in the growing backlash to bail
reform efforts demonstrates that crime risk dwarfs flight risk, in the view
of both courts and the public, as a concern in the pretrial phase.26 The
focus on crime risk suggests that a substantial portion of the millions of
people who cycle through jails each year are there because they were
perceived to be dangerous.
There are many possible explanations for the dramatic gap between
theory and practice. The most likely, we surmise, is that current practice
reflects an implicit discounting of the value of detainees’ well-being
relative to the well-being of potential crime victims. This might be
because accused people are viewed as criminals who have forfeited the
right to liberty; because accused people are disproportionately Black,
brown, and poor while the paradigmatic crime victim in the public
imagination is white and wealthy; because pretrial detention is assumed
to be credited against legitimate punishment imposed after conviction; or
all of the above.
Some of these grounds for discounting the welfare of arrestees are
easier to dismiss than others. The most difficult ground to dismiss is the
idea that arrestees are not entitled to the same concern as crime victims
because they are not wholly innocent; they are in some manner culpable
for having created the risk at issue. As one of us has written elsewhere,
this notion runs headlong into the presumption of innocence and
prohibition on pretrial punishment, foundational principles of the
American legal order.27 It is extremely difficult to reconcile those
principles with the idea that the state can discount the welfare of arrestees
on the basis of their (probable) guilt. Yet the intuition that the state may
treat accused persons as having impaired moral status is strong, and in
some circumstances, it seems unjust not to discount an arrestee’s welfare
relative to a person the arrestee is credibly alleged to have threatened.
This Article does not resolve the conflict between the prohibition on
pretrial punishment and the human impulse to discount the welfare of
25
But see Wiseman, supra note 12, at 1349 (arguing that detention is rarely necessary to
manage flight risk given advancing surveillance technologies).
26
See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, The Bail Reform Backlash that Has Democrats at War, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/nyregion/new-york-bailreform.html [https://perma.cc/NU9F-B3RZ]; see also, e.g., H.R. 81, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Ala. 2020) (proposing amendment to state constitution to permit pretrial detention for
dangerousness).
27
Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 537–38.
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arrestees in a cost-benefit calculus. Rather, it demonstrates that a rigorous
consequentialist analysis raises deep questions about how the law ought
to value individual liberty and welfare, questions that echo across many
fields of law. It also demonstrates that, left unexamined, consequentialist
rationales can mask decision-making processes that rely on judgments of
worth or that are dictated by perverse incentives. Confronting these
processes will be important to the long-term success of pretrial reform.
This Article makes four contributions. The first is to fully articulate the
consequentialist conceptual framework for detention decisions that
current law entails. The second is the method we devise to apply that
framework: relative harm valuation, which allows for the comparison of
intangible harms without resorting to the distorting intermediary of
dollars. This Article’s third contribution is the information the survey
reveals: Even short periods of jail detention impose harms as grave as
serious crimes. The logical corollary is that if we value the liberty of
accused people and crime victims by a common standard, pretrial
detention for the purpose of preventing crime is almost never warranted
on cost-benefit grounds. Finally, in illuminating the chasm between the
cost-benefit rationale for pretrial detention and our actual practices, this
Article highlights the need for policymakers, courts, and bail reformers to
grapple with the retributive impulse and institutional incentives that shape
detention practice on the ground.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the legal doctrine
that authorizes pretrial preventive detention on cost-benefit grounds. It
extrapolates the consequentialist conceptual framework that this doctrine
implies, then explains why existing empirical methods are inadequate to
weigh the harm of criminal victimization against the harm of
incarceration. Part II presents our relative-harm-valuation surveys and
explains the results. Part III explores the implications of the survey results
for pretrial policy and beyond.
I. WHAT DEGREE OF RISK JUSTIFIES DETENTION?
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the U.S. Constitution authorizes
pretrial preventive detention when the government’s interest in security
outweighs the individual’s interest in liberty.28 This raises the difficult
question of when the security benefit of detention—averting some
potential future harm—does outweigh its cost in liberty. How severe must
28

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987).
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the potential harm be and how likely to occur within a given timespan?
The question is of central importance to pretrial policy. Unfortunately,
neither law nor prior scholarship offers much of an answer. The central
obstacle has been the difficulty of valuing the intangible harms in the
balance.
A. The Governing Law
The Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial punishment.29 This is an
undisputed precept of American constitutional law. In ordinary speech,
both citizens and courts sometimes refer to this prohibition as the
“presumption of innocence,” although technically the presumption is just
“a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials.”30 In its
broader sense, though, the presumption stands for the proposition that the
state may not subject a person to “the stigma of a finding that he violated
a criminal law and to the possibility of institutional confinement” except
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.31 The state may not impose
punishment before conviction. In this sense, the presumption of
innocence is a “bedrock” principle, “axiomatic and elementary,” the
enforcement of which “lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law.”32
The prohibition on pretrial punishment does not, however, preclude all
pretrial deprivations of liberty. The government has an important interest
in ensuring that criminal legal proceedings unfold fairly and promptly. It
can limit individual liberty as necessary in order to protect that interest by
requiring accused people and witnesses to show up for court, by imposing
conditions of release, and, in some circumstances, by detaining an
accused person or witness pending trial.33 Such detention does not claim
justification on the basis of guilt, but rather on the basis of a cost-benefit
analysis; the state’s interest in ensuring the fair and prompt administration
of justice simply outweighs the individual’s right to liberty.

29
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (noting that
pretrial punishment is unconstitutional).
30
Bell, 441 U.S. at 533.
31
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
32
Id. at 363 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
33
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“The right to release before trial is conditioned upon
the accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found
guilty.”).
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United States v. Salerno tested the government’s authority to detain an
accused person for a different reason: to prevent the arrestee from
committing other crimes unrelated to the pending charge.34 The
petitioners argued that such detention for dangerousness constituted
pretrial punishment, but the Supreme Court disagreed.35 The Court
reasoned that the detention was not intended as punishment.36 The
government did not seek to justify the detention by reference to the
petitioners’ guilt for the offenses charged.37 The government sought to
justify the detention, instead, solely on the basis of danger. It claimed that,
in view of the risk the petitioners posed, detention was necessary to
protect public welfare.
Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit had held that the government may not detain a
person on grounds of dangerousness alone. Substantive due process, the
Second Circuit held, categorically “prohibits the total deprivation of
liberty simply as a means of preventing future crimes.”38 The Supreme
Court rejected that view. It concluded that danger alone may indeed be a
sufficient basis for pretrial detention because “the Government’s
regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances,
outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.”39
Salerno thus appeared to authorize pretrial preventive detention on
pure cost-benefit—or consequentialist—grounds.40 To say that detention
is permitted when the government’s interest in safety “outweighs” an
individual’s interest in liberty is to say that detention is permitted when
the harm the government seeks to avert exceeds the harm that detention
inflicts on the individual detained. Detention is permitted when its

34

481 U.S. at 741.
Id. at 746–47.
36
Id. at 747.
37
Id.; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (“In a civil commitment state
power is not exercised in a punitive sense.”); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997)
(holding “that involuntary confinement pursuant to the [Kansas Sexually Violent Predator]
Act is not punitive”).
38
United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71–72 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
39
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748.
40
We recognize that this is not the only possible interpretation of Salerno; a deontological
characterization of the Court’s reasoning might also be possible. We adopt the consequentialist
interpretation, however, because it is the most obvious and straightforward reading of the
Court’s language.
35
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benefits exceed its costs.41 If, on the other hand, detention is an
“excessive” response to the state’s concerns, either at the outset or
because of its duration, the detention becomes punitive and violates due
process.42
Salerno left open the question of when exactly the governmental
interest in safety does outweigh the individual’s interest in liberty: How
dangerous must a person be to justify the state in locking her up for the
greater good? The Court held that the federal preventive detention regime
(as it existed in 1987) satisfied due process in part because the regime
limited detention eligibility to those charged with “a specific category of
extremely serious offenses” and required the state to prove that the
individual posed a “demonstrable danger” that could not be managed
through less intrusive means.43 But the Court offered no further clarity
about the type and degree of risk that constitutes a sufficient threat in an
individual case.
The other layers of law that govern pretrial detention practice add some
detail to Salerno’s broad consequentialist framework, but not all that
much. In federal law, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 embeds the
consequentialist framework that Salerno endorsed. As the Salerno Court
noted, the Bail Reform Act permits detention only for those charged with
certain offenses that Congress “specifically found” to denote a threat, and
only if no condition of release can “reasonably assure” the safety of the
community.44 The implied logic of this scheme is that when a person is
charged with an offense that indicates special risk and a court determines
that the person poses a threat that cannot be managed through less
intrusive means, the benefit of preventive detention outweighs its cost in
liberty.
The implementation of the Act and its evolution over time have
undercut its consequentialist logic, however. Following the lead of the
Senate Report that accompanied the Act at its passage, courts have
defined “safety” in extremely broad terms.45 Congress has gradually
41

This is true at least in the pretrial context. The Salerno Court did not specify whether this
reasoning applies to people not charged with any crime. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748.
42
See id. at 747–48; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538–39 (1979).
43
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747–50.
44
Id. at 750; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 (e)-(f) (enumerating various criminal charges that
raise a “rebuttable presumption” that the perpetrator will endanger “the safety of any other
person or the community” before trial and is therefore eligible for preventative detention).
45
S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 12 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3195 (“[T]he
language referring to the safety of the community refers to the danger that the defendant might
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expanded the list of detention-eligible offenses, as well as the
circumstances that give rise to a “presumption” of dangerousness.46 And
the statute never did require the court considering detention to explicitly
weigh the benefit of detention against its costs. So, although the Bail
Reform Act pays lip service to consequentialist reasoning, it authorizes a
great deal of preventive detention without rigorous cost-benefit analysis.
As of 2018, federal pretrial detention rates were hovering around 70%,
more than double what they were in 1988.47 The federal detention regime
does not provide any clarity as to when the benefit of detention in fact
exceeds its costs.
One might look to state law for answers, given that many states have
codified pretrial preventive detention provisions in their constitutions or
statutory law. But existing state law is not much help either. As one of us
recently summarized the field:
Six of the nineteen state constitutional provisions that authorize
preventive [pretrial] detention condition it on a risk of violence. But ten
condition it on a vaguely articulated “danger” or the need to ensure
engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the community.”); id. (advising that “safety”
should “be given a broader construction than merely danger of harm involving physical
violence”); id. at 13 (“The Committee also emphasizes that the risk that a defendant will
continue to engage in drug trafficking constitutes a [relevant] danger . . . .”); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Kelsey, 82 F. App’x 652, 654 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Mr. Kelsey has demonstrated
an inability to stay away from drugs and drug-related activity, thereby making him a danger
to society.”); United States v. Strong, 775 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that “Congress
intended to equate traffic in drugs with a danger to the community”).
46
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)–(f) (1996), with 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)–(f) (2018) (adding
several additional criminal charges to the list of those that give rise to a presumption of
dangerousness). The “presumption” imposes only a burden of production on the defendant;
the government retains the burden of persuasion. E.g., United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939,
945 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Hearing on “The Administration of Bail by State and Federal
Courts: A Call for Reform” Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (testimony of Alison Siegler,
Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic) (describing
current federal detention practices); Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The Immediate
Consequences of Federal Pretrial Detention, 22 Am. Econ. & L. Rev. 24, 51–53 (2020) (using
an instrumental variables approach to analyze the effect of pretrial detention on federal case
outcomes and finding that detention increases the likely sentence).
47
Matthew G. Rowland, The Rising Federal Pretrial Detention Rate, in Context, 82 Fed.
Prob. 13, 13 (2018). This shift appears to be at least partly due to the high pretrial detention
rate (around 95%) for immigration offenses, id. at 14 fig.3, which now constitute around a
third of the federal docket. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2020, U.S. Courts,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2020 [https://p
erma.cc/4UZ6-6FL6] (last visited Oct. 31, 2021) (reporting that immigration offenses
“constituted 36 percent of all criminal defendant filings” in federal court in 2020).
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“safety,” and three do not articulate a severity-of-harm threshold at
all. State statutory law varies tremendously, but rarely provides an
explicit severity-of-harm threshold. . . . As for the likelihood of harm,
most laws mandate restraint if it is necessary to “adequately protect” or
“reasonably assure” the safety of the community.48

These vague legal standards provide minimal guidance.
Many states aspire to do better. New Jersey and New Mexico have
recently enacted new constitutional provisions and statutes governing
pretrial detention.49 In 2021, Illinois became the first state to eliminate
money bail, which should have the effect of limiting pretrial detention to
the circumstances in which the Illinois Constitution allows it.50 Other state
legislatures may pursue pretrial reform in coming years,51 and if they do
they will look to the existing systems that minimize reliance on cash bail:
the new regimes in New Jersey, New Mexico, and Illinois; the federal
Bail Reform Act52 and the pretrial detention law of the District of
Columbia;53 the Uniform Law Commission’s (“ULC”) new Pretrial

48

Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 561.
N.J. Const. art. 1, ¶ 11 (amended 2017); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:162-15 et seq. (West 2021);
N.M. Const. art. II, § 13 (amended 2016); N.M. Dist. Ct. R. Crim. Proc. §§ 5-401, 5-409
(2020). California’s legislature passed a comprehensive bail reform statute, but the voters
rejected it by referendum. E.g., Mathew Borges, California Rejects Proposition to End Cash
Bail, Jurist (Nov. 5, 2020, 12:08 PM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2020/11/california-rejectsproposition-to-end-cash-bail [https://perma.cc/KJ5Z-4A7W]. New York enacted
comprehensive bail reform but subsequently rolled it back substantially and remains alone
among the states in prohibiting detention on the basis of dangerousness. Roxanna Asgarian,
The Controversy over New York’s Bail Reform Law, Explained, Vox (Jan. 17, 2020, 8:30
AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2020/1/17/21068807/new-york-bail-reform-law-explai
ned [https://perma.cc/3QHN-FRF2]; Jamiles Lartey, New York Rolled Back Bail Reform.
What Will The Rest Of The Country Do?, The Marshall Project (Apr. 23, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/23/in-new-york-s-bail-reform-backlash-acautionary-tale-for-other-states [https://perma.cc/5U5S-5ZC7].
50
VICTORY: Illinois Just Passed the Pretrial Fairness Act and Ended Money Bail, Chi.
Council of Lawyers (Jan. 13, 2021), https://chicagocouncil.org/illinois-just-passed-thepretrial-fairness-act-and-ended-money-bail/ [https://perma.cc/USK6-7XNM]; Ill. Const. art.
I, § 9 (permitting detention only for those charged with an offense punishable by death, life
imprisonment, or mandatory prison time “when the court, after a hearing, determines that
release of the offender would pose a real and present threat to the physical safety of any
person”).
51
See, e.g., Naila Awan, Winnable Criminal Justice Reforms in 2022, Prison Pol’y Initiative
(Dec. 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/winnable2022.html [https://perma.cc/KQ6
M-E9R3] (advocating a number of pretrial reforms).
52
18 U.S.C. § 3142 et seq. (2021).
53
D.C. Code § 23-1321 et seq. (2021).
49
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Release and Detention Act;54 and statute templates developed by
advocacy organizations.55 All of these models share the same structure.
They permit detention to prevent future crime when the risk is serious and
when no intervention short of detention can adequately reduce it. The
implied logic, again, is consequentialist. Each regime strives to articulate
the conditions under which the benefit of detention outweighs its cost in
liberty.
Even these vanguard regimes, however, are hazy about what risk is
sufficiently serious to justify detention. The ULC Act, which is arguably
the most specific, authorizes detention when a court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that “it is likely that the individual will abscond,
obstruct justice, violate an order of protection, or cause significant harm
to another person,” or it is “extremely likely” that a person charged with
a felony will not appear in court, and “no less restrictive condition is
sufficient to address satisfactorily the relevant risk.”56 The Act does not
specify what constitutes “significant harm,” what probability of harm
makes it “likely,” or what degree of risk reduction would address the risk
“satisfactorily.” Nor does the Act designate specific detention-eligible
offenses; it leaves that task to states that adopt it.57
Lastly, one might look to the law governing preventive detention in
other arenas for help. After all, pretrial detention is just one form of
preventive detention among many.58 Other routine forms of preventive
detention include involuntary civil commitment,59 material witness
54

Pretrial Release & Det. Act (Unif. L. Comm’n 2020). One of the authors served as
Associate Reporter for the Act.
55
Andrea Woods & Portia Allen-Kyle, ACLU Smart Just., A New Vision for Pretrial Justice
in the United States 1 (2019); Civ. Rts. Corps, Pretrial Release and Detention Act 1 (2020);
Timothy R. Schnacke, Ctr. for Legal & Evidence-Based Pracs., “Model” Bail Laws: ReDrawing the Line Between Pretrial Release and Detention 8 (2017); Colin Doyle, Chiraag
Bains & Brook Hopkins, Harv. L. Sch. Crim. Just. Pol’y Program, Bail Reform: A Guide for
State and Local Policymakers 1–2 (2019).
56
Pretrial Release & Det. Act § 403 (Unif. L. Comm’n 2020).
57
See id. § 102(4) and comment.
58
See Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and
Practice, 2 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 85, 86–87 (2011) (“Preventive detention is not prohibited by
U.S. law or especially frowned upon in tradition or practice. . . . The federal government and
all 50 states together possess a wide range of statutory preventive detention regimes that are
frequently used, many of which provoke little social or legal controversy.”).
59
Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7 Psychiatry 30,
31–38 (2010); Klein & Wittes, supra note 58, at 87 (noting the state’s “protective custody
powers, permitting the noncriminal detention—often for their own protection—of, among
others, the intoxicated, alcoholics, drug addicts, the homeless, and pregnant drug users”).
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detention,60 immigration detention,61 and the detention of juveniles who
have been adjudicated delinquent.62 Less routinely, the state can detain
individuals who present a national security threat in wartime.63 And as we
have all learned, the state can mandate and enforce quarantine to prevent
the transmission of disease.64 There are important differences across these
contexts, but the justification for depriving a person of liberty is the same
in each: the deprivation is necessary to avert some greater harm. The
question is what risk is sufficient to restrict a person’s liberty for the
greater good.
The only lesson from this landscape, however, is that the question has
proven intractable and enduring. Constitutional litigation has led the
Supreme Court to articulate procedural requirements for detention
decisions, but never a substantive risk standard.65 Preventive detention
60
Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Crim. Proc. 673 (4th ed. 2004)
(“Nearly all states have enacted provisions dealing with the pretrial confinement of material
witnesses.”).
61
See, e.g., Frances M. Kreimer, Note, Dangerousness on the Loose: Constitutional Limits
to Immigration Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1485, 1485–89
(2012).
62
See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–19 (1967) (summarizing history and objectives of
juvenile court system, in which “the procedures, from apprehension through
institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive”); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,
281 (1984) (rejecting constitutional challenge to juvenile detention pending adjudication).
63
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”);
Klein & Wittes, supra note 58, at 87. The most infamous example of wartime preventive
detention in U.S. history was the Japanese internment during World War II, upheld by the
Supreme Court in two decisions that the Court has quite recently renounced. Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 91–92 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 214–19
(1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (“Korematsu was
gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be
clear—‘has no place in law under the Constitution.’ ”) (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248
(Jackson, J., dissenting)). Notably, the Court found the Japanese internment retrospectively
unconstitutional because the criterion for detention was race alone. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423
(“The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the
basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority.”
(emphasis added)).
64
See, e.g., Polly J. Price, Epidemics, Outsiders, and Local Protection: Federalism Theater
in the Era of the Shotgun Quarantine, 19 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 369, 420–22 (2016) (describing
the federal government’s quarantine authority); Michael R. Ulrich & Wendy K. Mariner,
Quarantine and the Federal Role in Epidemics, 71 SMU L. Rev. 391, 398–412 (2018)
(discussing the legality of federal quarantine regulations).
65
In the context of civil commitment, the Court has held that due process prohibits
commitment in the absence of danger, O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573–76 (1975),
and requires the state to prove “dangerousness” by clear and convincing evidence. Addington
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statutes are notoriously non-specific. One treatise synthesizes the
“dangerousness” standards in civil commitment statutes as follows:
[T]he potential harm must be serious or substantial, but the patient need
not be homicidal. By some authority, the potential harm must be
physical, but, by other authority, emotional injury to others may be
sufficient. Potential harm to property may be sufficient, but there is
contrary authority.66

No standard civil commitment statute specifies the numerical probability
of the relevant harm occurring within a given timespan that is sufficient
to warrant confinement.67 Statutes providing for the indefinite
commitment of “sexually violent predators” are, for the most part, equally

v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979). But it has not defined “dangerousness.” As a bevy of
commentators has noted, the requirement of clear and convincing evidence of
“dangerousness” is largely meaningless without some specification of the probability and
magnitude of harm that constitutes “danger.” See John Monahan & David B. Wexler, A
Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 L. & Hum. Behav. 37, 37–38
(1978) (pointing out the distinction between a procedural standard of proof like “clear and
convincing evidence” and a substantive “standard of commitment”—the probability of harm
that justifies a liberty deprivation); Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal
Standard for Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3
Psych. Pub. Pol’y & L. 33, 42–43 (1997) (describing a standard of proof as “a standard for
measuring epistemological uncertainty,” whereas a standard of commitment is “a standard for
measuring ontological uncertainty”); Fredrick E. Vars, Delineating Sexual Dangerousness, 50
Hous. L. Rev. 855, 855–60 (2013) (discussing this distinction further). With respect to
“sexually violent predators” (“SVPs”), the Court has not specified what likelihood of a future
sex offense over what timespan is sufficient to justify detention, nor what type of prospective
sex offense is sufficiently severe. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 346–49 (1997);
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002) (addressing and resolving other questions about
SVP commitment, but not that one). Quarantine, meanwhile, is uncharted constitutional terrain
at the Supreme Court. The Court has never determined whether due process sets a risk
threshold for involuntary sequestration. See Ulrich & Mariner, supra note 64, at 403–23
(arguing that constitutional standards for involuntary civil commitment should apply equally
to involuntary quarantine).
66
56 C.J.S. Mental Health § 46 (2021). There is similar variation with respect to the
probability and imminence of the potential harm that justifies detention. Id.
67
See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 1190, 1240–41 (1974) (“The failure of present commitment standards to indicate what
probabilities of various harms justify commitment creates the danger that courts will ignore
the central question in police power commitments—the amount of anticipated social harm
required before an individual can be deprived of his liberty for a specified period.”); Grant H.
Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. Contemp. Legal
Issues 61, 71 (1999) (“The statement remains as true today as when it was made twenty-five
years ago.”).
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vague.68 Most require the government to show that the person at issue is
“dangerous”;69or it must show that it is “likely”70 or that there is a “high”71
or “substantial[]”72 risk that he will commit a sexual offense if not
institutionalized. Although a handful of jurisdictions do require a finding
that the potential harm is more likely than not (the probability exceeds
50%),73 courts in other jurisdictions have explicitly rejected a numerical
threshold.74 To the authors’ knowledge, no statute or court has articulated

68

Around half of the states have enacted such a statute. E.g., Sexually Violent Persons, Ariz.
Rev. Stat. §§ 36-3701–17 (LexisNexis 2017); Sexually Violent Predators, Cal. Welf. & Inst.
Code §§ 6600–09 (West 2014); Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators,
Fla. Stat. §§ 394.912–.926 (2010); Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 Ill. Comp.
Stat. §§ 207/1–/99 (2013). So has Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006) (passed as part of the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006).
69
E.g., N.Y. Mental Hyg. L. § 10.03 (Consol. 2018) (providing for commitment of those
“likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses”); D.C. Code §§ 22-3803(1), 223808 (2012) (providing for the commitment of a person “who by a course of repeated
misconduct in sexual matters has evidenced such lack of power to control his or her sexual
impulses as to be dangerous to other persons”).
70
E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-3701(7)(b) (LexisNexis 2017); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 6600(a)(1) (West 2019); Fla. Stat. § 394.912(10)(b) (2016); 2018 Kan. Sess. Laws 828; 1985
Mass. Acts 1190–91; Minn. Stat. § 253D.02(16)(a) (2021); 2006 Neb. Laws 24–31; 1998 N.J.
Laws 660; N.D. Cent. Code § 25-03.3-01(8); N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.03(e) (Consol.
2018); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-30(9); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(a)(2); 2009
Va. Acts 82.
71
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135-E:1 (2010).
72
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/5(f); Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-501(2) (2000).
73
1998 Iowa Acts 420; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.480(5) (2017); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 71.09.020(8) (2021); Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) (2021); see also Westerheide v. State, 767 So.
2d 637, 652–53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (defining “likely” as “having a better chance of
existing or occurring than not”); G.H. v. Mental Health Bd. (In re Interest of G.H.), 781
N.W.2d 438, 445 (Neb. 2010) (“Medical expert testimony regarding causation based upon
possibility or speculation is insufficient; it must be stated as being at least ‘probable,’ in other
words, more likely than not.”).
74
People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949, 972 (Cal. 2002) (“[T]he statute does not
require a precise determination that the chance of reoffense is better than even. . . . [T]he
person is ‘likely’ to reoffend if . . . the person presents a substantial danger, that is, a serious
and well-founded risk, that he or she will commit such crimes if free in the community.”);
Commonwealth v. Boucher, 780 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Mass. 2002) (“While ‘likely’ indicates more
than a mere propensity or possibility, it is not bound to the statistical probability inherent in a
definition such as ‘more likely than not,’ and the terms are not interchangeable.”); In re Civ.
Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 16, 21 (Minn. 2014) (“The term ‘likely’ . . . does not
indicate a defined numeric level of certainty . . . . We also conclude that ‘highly likely’ cannot
be defined by a numeric value.”); cf. In re Det. of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001) (“We determine that the phrase ‘substantially probable’ in the Act also means ‘much
more likely than not’ . . . . However, we emphasize that this definition cannot be reduced to a
mere mathematical formula or statistical analysis.”).
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a risk standard that anchors a numerical probability to a defined time
period.
The vagueness of “danger” standards in the law of preventive detention
has frustrated scholars for generations. As Eric Janus and Paul Meehl
once explained, “Developing quantified measures for the standard of
commitment is an essential step in assuring that the standard in use is
indeed the high standard claimed, and that the standard can be enforced
and applied fairly and uniformly in the trial and appellate process.”75
Many others have echoed the point, urging legislatures and courts to
specify the magnitude and probability of harm (over a specified timespan)
that can justify detention in each context.76 With few exceptions, their
pleas have fallen on deaf ears.
The state of play, then, is that the Supreme Court has affirmed the
government’s authority to preventively detain accused people on the basis
of consequentialist balancing, but neither Supreme Court doctrine nor any
other body of relevant law offers much guidance about how severe and
how likely a potential future harm must be in order to justify depriving a
person of liberty. Nonetheless, preventive detention regimes that invoke
consequentialist logic are in operation across the country. More will be
soon. The question of what risk justifies detention is as important as it is
daunting.
B. Conceptual Framework
How should one evaluate when detention is justified in consequentialist
terms? The subject is shockingly undertheorized.77 This is, in significant
75

Janus & Meehl, supra note 65, at 60.
E.g., Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 59–60; Abhi Raghunathan, Note, “Nothing Else but
Mad”: The Hidden Costs of Preventive Detention, 100 Geo. L.J. 967, 967 (2012) (lamenting
that “for over thirty years, the Court has consistently refused to define the term dangerous”);
Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 498–99; Eliot T. Tracz, Mentally Ill, or
Mentally Ill and Dangerous? Rethinking Civil Commitments in Minnesota, 40 Mitchell
Hamline L.J. Pub. Pol’y & Prac. 137, 139 (2019) (noting that the Minnesota Treatment and
Commitment Act “lacks sorely needed definitions of ‘serious physical harm’ as well as
‘dangerous’ that would allow district courts . . . to make decisions in a consistent manner”).
77
See Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 59 (“People are confined to prevent predicted harms
without any systematic effort to decide what kinds of harms warrant preventive confinement;
or what degree of likelihood should be required; or what duration of preventive confinement
should be permitted; or what relationship should exist between the harm, the likelihood, or the
duration.”); Morris, supra note 67, at 63 (noting that, since Dershowitz’s lament, “no
jurisprudence of preventive detention has emerged”); Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits
of the Preventive State, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 771, 774 (1998) (calling for attention
76
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part, because scholars revolt against it. Most people who write in this
realm hold that the state may never detain people who are responsible
agents solely to prevent future crime.78 Salerno rejected that principle and
drew a storm of criticism. The bulk of legal scholarship on preventive
detention since has centered on why Salerno is wrong, or on developing
theoretical models for preventive detention that invoke principles of
forfeiture or self-defense in order to avoid resort to Salerno’s frank
consequentialism.79 But the scholarly hostility has not redrawn the legal
landscape. Pretrial preventive detention is almost surely here to stay.80
This Article instead takes Salerno as a starting point and asks when
detention is justified on consequentialist grounds. This is not to endorse
Salerno’s cost-benefit framework.81 Rather, we take existing law as a

to this area). More recently, scholarship on preventive restraint has proliferated, see Sandra G.
Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 301, 305
nn.13–15 (2015) [hereinafter, Mayson, Collateral Consequences] (surveying literature of the
“preventive state”), but very few scholars have attempted to identify just what magnitude and
likelihood of harm justifies preventive incarceration.
78
The academic orthodoxy is that a person who threatens harm is either “mad or bad.” The
“bad”—people who possess agency, and thus responsibility—must be handled through the
criminal law. Only the “mad”—who lack full agency—may be preventively incapacitated. To
detain a person solely to prevent some act that is within her control, the theory goes, is to deny
her agency. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Pre-Trial Detention and the Presumption of Innocence, in
Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law 123, 128–29 (Andrew Ashworth, Lucia
Zedner, Patrick Tomlin eds., 2013) (explaining that, according to “traditional liberal”
principles, “[r]esponsible agents ought to be left free to determine their own conduct . . . and
are properly liable to coercion only if and when they embark on a criminal enterprise”);
Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. Rev.
113, 117–18 (1996) (explaining the mad-or-bad principle).
79
See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 15, at 536 (arguing that preventive detention requires a
“moral predicate” of wrongdoing); Alec Walen, The Mechanics of Claims and Permissible
Killings in War 10–13 (2019) (developing and applying a complex deontological framework
to evaluate preemptive killing); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Preventive Justice and the
Presumption of Innocence, 8 Crim L. & Phil. 505, 508–09 (2014) [hereinafter Ferzan,
Preventive Justice] (arguing that states may restrain “[c]ulpable [a]ggressor[s]” who threaten
future harm); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty
Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 141, 146–47 (2011)
[hereinafter Ferzan, Beyond Crime]; Alec Walen, A Punitive Precondition for Preventive
Detention: Lost Status as a Foundation for a Lost Immunity, 48 San Diego L. Rev. 1229, 1240
(2011) [hereinafter Walen, A Punitive Precondition].
80
See Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1399, 1450
(2017) (“[T]here is almost universal agreement that bail judges should be engaging in some
form of cost-benefit analysis.”).
81
For critique of a cost-benefit approach, see, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 15, at 510; Bernard
E. Harcourt, The Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public Policy and CostBenefit Analysis, 47 J. Legal Stud. 419, 421–22 (2018). For a defense of a cost-benefit
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given for now, and operate within it, as lawyers do when they make
arguments in court.82 The goal is to understand when detention is justified
according to the rationale that state governments have proffered and that
the Supreme Court has endorsed.
Even for those who reject a strict consequentialist approach to pretrial
preventive detention, the inquiry here is relevant. One might believe that
preventive detention cannot be justified unless a person has forfeited her
right against it, for instance. Or one might believe that the most important
question is whether pretrial detention policies are justified, given their
distributional effects. But even scholars who take those positions typically
also believe that a given instance of detention must produce net benefit to
be justified.83 That is: net social benefit is a necessary condition for
preventive detention, even if it is not a sufficient one.
To be justified in consequentialist terms, detention must produce net
benefit both in absolute terms and relative to alternatives. The benefit of
detention must outweigh its costs. Even if it does, detention is not justified
if a less costly alternative—supportive therapy, say, or electronic
monitoring—would produce comparable benefit. Detention is only
justified in consequentialist terms if its marginal benefit outweighs its
marginal cost, relative to alternative interventions.84 That is: detention
must produce greater net benefit than would electronic monitoring,
mental health treatment with supervision, or any other alternative. The
criterion of marginal net benefit translates loosely into the leastrestrictive-means principle that anchors so many pretrial regimes.85
For present purposes, however, we bracket the requirement of marginal
net benefit and focus on the preliminary question of when preventive

approach, see Sandra G. Mayson, A Consequentialist Framework for Prevention, L. & Phil.
(forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter, Mayson, Consequentialist Framework].
82
That is, we operate from a perspective “internal” to existing law.
83
E.g., Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to Preventive
Detention for Suspected Terrorists, 70 Md. L. Rev. 871, 938 (2011).
84
See also Mayson, Collateral Consequences, supra note 77, at 322 n.102 (arguing that
incapacitation is only justified if the incremental security benefit outweighs the incremental
cost); Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 563 n.319 (arguing that the relevant
question concerning pretrial detention is whether the incremental prevention benefit provided
by detention outweighs the incremental cost of alternatives).
85
E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(c)(B) (West 2018) (directing courts to release arrestees on
condition that they refrain from crime, provide a DNA sample, and “subject to the least
restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that such judicial officer determines
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community”).
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detention does more good than harm. This is a minimum requirement for
preventive detention to be justified. To determine when detention does
more good than harm, one must identify the benefits and harms at stake.
The primary benefit of detaining a person perceived to be dangerous is
preventing potential crime. The primary beneficiary is the person who
would otherwise have been victimized, but avoiding a crime also provides
indirect benefit to the would-be victim’s family and diffuse benefit by
improving the community’s sense of security. On the other side of the
balance are the costs of detention. These costs primarily befall the person
deprived of liberty, but detention also inflicts indirect and diffuse costs,
including hardship to the detainee’s family and insecurity or fear of the
police in his community. There are fiscal costs on both sides of the ledger
as well: the costs of policing and prosecution; the costs of incarceration.
The point at which detention averts greater harm than it inflicts is a
function of (1) the costs of detention, (2) the number and nature of crimes
that detention will avert, and (3) the costs of those crimes. The analysis is
complicated by the fact that we can never know in advance who would
commit harm if not detained. We can never know the precise number and
nature of crimes that a single detention would avert. The best we can do
is estimate probabilities. This does not make the cost-benefit analysis of
detention impossible. It just means that the risk threshold at which pretrial
detention may be justified is based on expected harm.
By way of illustration, presume that Joe has a 10% likelihood of
committing car theft if not detained. This is to say that Joe belongs to a
group of people within which we expect the rate of car theft to be 10%.
For this population, we can expect ten detentions to avert one car theft.86
With much greater confidence, we can expect 1000 detentions to avert

86
This statement simplifies complex principles of probability. If one understands the
estimate that Joe has a 10% probability of stealing a car in frequentist terms, as we have
described it in the text, it is simply a restatement of the estimate to say that detaining ten people
like Joe is projected to avert one car theft. If one understands the estimate instead as conveying
a quality specific to Joe, then detaining ten people like Joe (each of whom had a 10% chance
of otherwise stealing a car) might avert anywhere from zero to ten car thefts. Each of the
detainees might otherwise have stolen a car or might not have. There is a probabilistic
distribution across those possibilities (from zero to ten thefts averted). It is exceedingly
unlikely that ten detentions avert ten thefts. The most likely scenario is that they avert one—
but it is almost as likely that they avert zero or two. We think the proposition that “we can
expect to avert one car theft” is a fair layman’s statement of this probabilistic distribution of
potential outcomes.
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around 100 car thefts.87 The cost-benefit question is whether this tradeoff
is worth it. Is car theft more than ten times as costly as each detention,
such that we are justified in detaining ten people for every theft we avert?
How much detention should we be willing to inflict to prevent the theft
of a car?
The answer to the question of how much detention we should accept to
prevent one crime translates into a risk threshold for detention. If car theft
is twice as costly as one detention, we should accept up to two detentions
in order to avert one theft. Detaining those with only a 10% chance of
stealing a car is not cost-justified; it would result in ten detentions, not
two, for every car theft averted, thereby inflicting much more harm than
it averts. If car theft is twice as costly as detention, as we have been
assuming, the risk threshold for detention is 50%. Below that threshold,
the cost of detention will exceed the averted cost of crime, in aggregate.
Above it, the reverse is true.88
A last important point about the consequentialist framework is that, in
weighing the costs and benefits of detention, there is no apparent basis to
discount the well-being of the potential detainee. An arrested person has
not been convicted of a crime. As one of us has argued extensively
elsewhere, there is no clear ground to treat arrested people as having a
different moral status, or a lesser right to liberty, than anyone else.89 To
invoke a person’s culpability as justification for pretrial detention would
seem to contravene the constitutional prohibition on pretrial punishment.
The stated rationale for pretrial preventive detention, moreover—the one
endorsed by Salerno—has nothing to do with culpability for past acts. It
is forward-looking; the state claims authority to detain on the basis of risk
alone. Lastly, there is no legal doctrine establishing that a mere accusation
of criminal conduct reduces a person’s right to liberty.90 Given the
prohibition on pretrial punishment and the absence of any clear ground
for treating arrestees’ well-being as less important than other people’s, we
assume—for now—that the government must value the liberty of an
accused person just as it would value anyone else’s liberty for cost-benefit
purposes. The Article returns to this point in Part III below.
87
By virtue of the “law of large numbers.” See, e.g., Michel Dekking, C. Kraaikamp, H.P.
Lopuhaä & L.E. Meester, A Modern Introduction to Probability and Statistics 181–90 (2005).
88
In reality, risk assessment (both clinical and actuarial) typically estimates a person’s
likelihood of committing various types of crime, rather than specific criminal offenses.
89
Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 499.
90
Id.
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To summarize: the stated justification for pretrial preventive detention
is the consequentialist notion of net social benefit. To be cost-justified,
detention must, at a minimum, avert greater harm than it inflicts. In other
words, detention must be expected to avert greater harm in terms of
criminal victimization than it inflicts in terms of lost liberty. In
determining when this is so, there is no reason to value the liberty of the
putative detainee any differently than yours or mine.
C. Prior Estimates of the Risk Threshold for Detention
The central obstacle to determining what risk justifies detention is that
it is thought to be difficult, if not impossible, to weigh the relevant
harms—criminal victimization and incarceration—against each other.
There is little scholarship that even makes an attempt. The scholarship
that does falls into two categories. The first assesses what degree of risk
various system actors believe is necessary to justify detention, as well as
what risk thresholds they apply in practice. The second takes a traditional
cost-benefit approach, translating both the benefits and costs of detention
into monetary terms. Both bodies of literature primarily address detention
in the context of civil commitment, but they are relevant to pretrial
preventive detention too.
1. Risk Thresholds in Belief and Practice
Scholars who have opined on the degree of risk that justifies preventive
detention typically believe that only very high risk should suffice. Steven
Morse, for instance, has speculated that “[m]ost informed persons would
probably agree that the ‘correct’ probability [of serious future harm]
required for preventive detention is . . . in excess of 80%.”91 Grant Morris
has argued that “preventive detention of an allegedly dangerous mentally
disordered person should require a ninety percent probability that, in the
absence of confinement, . . . violent crime, suicide or self-inflicted
mayhem will occur within six months.”92 Morse and Morris, to be clear,
are writing about indefinite civil commitment. Even with respect to more

91

Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment
of the Mentally Disabled, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 54, 74 (1982).
92
Morris, supra note 67, at 77; see also Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at
560 (“[N]othing less than a substantial likelihood of serious violent crime within a six-month
span can justify onerous restraints on liberty.”).
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short-term preventive detention, though, scholars typically advocate a
high risk-threshold.93
Judges appear to use lower risk-thresholds in practice. In 2003, John
Monahan and Eric Silver surveyed twenty-six practicing judges on “the
lowest likelihood of violence to others” within twenty weeks that they
would accept as demonstrating “dangerousness” for purposes of shortterm civil commitment.94 A majority expressed willingness to commit at
a likelihood of 26%. Half the judges considered an 8% chance of violence
to be sufficient, and three considered a 1% chance to be sufficient.95 A
2016 study found that judges believe the risk threshold is much higher for
indefinite commitment.96 But these beliefs may not translate into practice.
A 1997 quantitative analysis of indefinite “sex offender” commitments in
Minnesota estimated that courts were indefinitely committing people with
a 30% to 50% likelihood of recidivism.97
Research on jurors, meanwhile, suggests that ordinary citizens are
willing to commit a person indefinitely on probabilities of future harm
well under 50%. A 2014 study that simulated civil commitment
proceedings found that the simulation-jurors’ implicit risk thresholds for
commitment ranged from a 20% to 40% probability of future sexual
violence, with a mean of 31%.98 Another 2014 study asked 153 actual
93

Few, however, have offered a numerical threshold. Christopher Slobogin, for instance,
argues that preventive detention must be constrained by a “proportionality principle,” which
provides that only serious risk can justify serious preventive restraint, and a “consistency
principle” requiring that the criteria for preventive detention be consistent inside and outside
the criminal law. Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1, 4–5 (2003) (“The proportionality principle requires that the degree of danger be roughly
proportionate to the proposed government intervention.”).
94
John Monahan & Eric Silver, Judicial Decision Thresholds for Violence Risk
Management, 2 Int’l. J. of Forensic Mental Health 1, 2–3 (2003). The participants were
required to select among the five risk classification groups produced by the MacArthur
Violence Risk Assessment Study, the lowest of which corresponded to a 1% chance of
violence within 20 weeks of release and the highest of which corresponded to a 76% chance.
Id.
95
Id. at 4.
96
Stephanie A. Evans & Karen L. Salekin, Violence Risk Communication: What do Judges
and Forensic Clinicians Prefer and Understand?, 3 J. of Threat Assessment & Mgmt. 143, 143
(2016) (surveying 127 forensic clinicians and 192 judges; reporting majority view that 21–
52% chance of future violence constitutes moderate risk and 53–99% constitutes high risk).
97
Janus & Meehl, supra note 65, at 41, 45 (relying on Minnesota sex offender commitment
cases and public information about sex offender recidivism and prediction to develop
estimates for the probability of recidivism among members of the commitment classes).
98
Nicholas Scurich & Daniel A. Krauss, The Presumption of Dangerousness in Sexual
Violent Predator Commitment Hearings, 13 L. Probability & Risk 91, 91 (2014).
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jurors who had adjudicated sexually-violent-predator commitment trials
what probability of a new sex crime was sufficient to demonstrate that
such a crime was “likely.”99 More than half the jurors thought that a 1%
chance was sufficient. More than 97% thought that a 25% chance was
sufficient.100
To our knowledge, there is only one similar study that addresses the
pretrial context. In 2020, Nicholas Scurich and Daniel A. Krauss surveyed
a representative sample of 420 Californians.101 The average respondent
deemed a 60% chance that an arrested person would fail to appear or
commit a new crime to be sufficient to justify detention until trial.102
As a whole, this body of research suggests that there is wide variation
in how individuals interpret terms like “likely,” as well as in the degree
of risk that people think is sufficient to justify preventive detention. A
non-trivial percentage of judges and jurors appear willing to commit
people indefinitely on quite low probabilities of future harm—even if it
is more likely than not, or much more likely than not, that the harm will
not transpire.
The central limitation of this literature, for our purposes, is that none
of it reflects an actual cost-benefit analysis. Judges’ and jurors’ beliefs
about when commitment is justified may be colored by a retributivist
impulse to punish people for bad deeds, bad character, or projected future
crime. Study subjects may also be influenced by perspective bias, such
that they discount the well-being of potential detainees to whom they do
not relate. Judges’ and jurors’ decisions in practice are almost certainly
influenced by their incentive to detain, lest a release decision result in
catastrophic harm. At the other end of the spectrum, scholars who assert
high risk-thresholds may be operating on the premise that detention
cannot be justified on pure consequentialist grounds alone. The risk
threshold that people believe can justify preventive detention, or that they
apply in practice, may have little connection to the threshold that a robust
cost-benefit analysis would produce.

99
Jefferson C. Knighton, Daniel C. Murrie, Marcus T. Boccaccini, & Darrel B. Turner, How
Likely Is “Likely To Reoffend” in Sex Offender Civil Commitment Trials?, 38 L. & Hum.
Behavior 293, 293 (2014). The jurors had participated in fourteen trials in total, each of which
resulted in a verdict of commitment. Id.
100
Id. at 300.
101
Nicholas Scurich & Daniel A. Krauss, Public’s Views of Risk Assessment Algorithms
and Pretrial Decision Making, 26 Psych. Pub. Pol’y & L. 1, 1 (2020).
102
Id.
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2. Traditional Cost-Benefit Analysis
The traditional approach to cost-benefit analysis of preventive
detention is to price the various harms and benefits of detention in dollars,
tally them up, and then see how much crime detention must avert to be
worth the cost. There are two significant problems with this approach.
The first is that, although there is a long literature estimating the dollarvalue cost of crime-to-crime victims, there is almost no literature
rigorously estimating the dollar-value cost of detention to detainees. The
second problem is that quantifying everything in dollars can introduce
distortion.
The cost-of-crime literature offers a helpful illustration of the
challenges in monetizing non-market harms.103 Broadly speaking, it uses
two methods: contingent valuation and jury awards. Contingent valuation
studies ask survey respondents how much they would pay to avoid or
minimize some harm—how much a person would pay, for instance, to
reduce the likelihood of a certain crime by 10%. The jury-award method
exploits damage awards in civil suits against crime perpetrators. The
average or median damages award for a particular crime type serves as an
estimate of the cost of that crime to its victim. Both methods have
advantages and limitations. Contingent valuation studies benefit from
broader data, but survey answers are purely hypothetical and are shaped
by the respondents’ financial status. Jury awards are real, but rare—few
crime victims bring civil suits—and likely skewed toward crimes
committed by the wealthy, since wealthy perpetrators are the only ones it
makes sense to sue.
The imprecision of these pricing methods produces cost-of-crime
estimates that vary widely. Three respected estimates for the personal cost
of a serious assault, for example, are $28,346,104 $42,646,105 and

103
For an overview, see Mark A.R. Kleiman, Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Gehred,
Measuring the Costs of Crime 5 (2014), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/246405.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U443-UUSB] (comparing cost of crime analysis to cost of illness studies to
provide a framework for policy makers).
104
Mark A. Cohen, Pain, Suffering, and Jury Awards: A Study of the Cost of Crime to
Victims, 22 L. & Soc’y Rev. 537, 546 (1988) (derived from jury awards; estimate is from
Table 3).
105
Ted R. Miller, Mark A Cohen & Brian Wiersema, Victim Costs and Consequences: A
New Look, Nat’l Inst. of Just. Rsch. Rep. (1996) (derived by adding up victim costs; estimate
is from Table 2 “Assault, NCVS with Injury”).
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$103,314106 (in 2021 dollars, scaled for inflation). Of note, though, there
is substantial consistency across the cost-of-crime literature in the ordinal
ranking of different offenses by cost. While the dollar amounts vary, the
ordering usually doesn’t: murder is more costly than robbery, robbery is
more costly than petty theft, and so forth.
Imprecision aside, the most basic obstacle to a rigorous cost-benefit
analysis of detention is that there is no reliable estimate of the personal
costs of detention.107 To our knowledge, there is only one prior estimate
with respect to pretrial detention, derived by Abrams and Rohlfs in
2011.108 Abrams and Rohlfs estimate the value of freedom (and the cost
of its loss) on the basis of arrested individuals’ willingness to pay cash
bail. They conclude that the value of ninety days of freedom for the
average person in their dataset is $1,000, or $11 per day. As they
acknowledge, this methodology assumes the ability to post money bail.
To the extent that people in their dataset remained in jail because they had
no choice rather than because they made a choice, the estimate is skewed
low.109
One might construct a cost-of-detention estimate on the basis of jury
awards in wrongful-conviction cases, which have proliferated in recent
years.110 But these awards vary tremendously from case to case. It is
extremely difficult, moreover, to separate out the extent to which the
awards compensate victims for the stigma of having been wrongfully
branded a criminal versus for the liberty deprivation per se. Still, one
scholar, Frederick Vars, has used the lowest award in the sample he
considered as a measure of the value of liberty: $68,045 for one year.111
106

Mark A. Cohen, Roland T. Rust, Sara Steen & Simon T. Tidd, Willingness-to-Pay for
Crime Control Programs, 42 Criminology 89, 89 (2004) (derived from contingent valuation
estimate in Table 2).
107
See Yang, supra note 80, at 1420. (“Unfortunately, very few studies have attempted to
empirically estimate and quantify this loss [of freedom].”). There is a sizable literature
exploring the post-release effects of incarceration on detainees and the broader public, but it
focuses on incarceration imposed as punishment after conviction. In that context, it is not clear
that the (theoretically) deserved loss of liberty should count as a relevant “cost.” When the
state seeks to preventively detain someone, on the other hand, the loss of liberty is not justified
on the basis of desert, and the personal costs of incarceration are a first-order concern.
108
David S. Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence
from the Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 49 Econ. Inquiry 750, 750 (2011) (estimating the value
of freedom on the basis of cash bail data from New Haven jails).
109
Id.
110
See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction
Law, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 35, 44–45 n.32, 49 n.63 (reporting recent awards).
111
Fredrick E. Vars, Delineating Sexual Dangerousness, 50 Hous. L. Rev. 855, 889 (2013).
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Notwithstanding the dearth of research on the personal costs of
detention, a few scholars have undertaken cost-benefit analyses of
preventive detention by traditional means. Vars, analyzing sexuallyviolent-predator commitment, concludes that “the minimum likelihood of
future sexual violence within five years that should be required for a fiveyear commitment” is 75%.112 Shima Baradaran Baughman, analyzing
pretrial detention, finds that the average cost of detention outweighs the
average benefit by a factor of two.113 She further concludes that detention
would have produced net benefit for approximately 31% of the
individuals in her data, and that courts could profitably detain 18% fewer
people if they made release decisions on the basis of actuarial risk.114
Crystal Yang, incorporating “the best available evidence on both the costs
and benefits of [pretrial] detention,” finds that “on the margin, pre-trial
detention imposes far larger costs than benefits.”115 Her findings relate to
the “marginal” defendant, whom some bail judges in her datasets would
release and others would detain.116 Yang notes the limitations of existing
data on the costs and benefits of detention, especially the cost of detention
to detainees; like Baughman, she uses the Rolfs & Abrams estimate of
$11/day.117
These cost-benefit analyses, although valiant, rely heavily on the
dubious translation of intangible costs—liberty deprivation and criminal
victimization—into monetary terms.118 This is the second major
112

Id. at 890.
Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2017).
Baughman estimates the relative costs of pretrial detention and release by tabulating a long
list of costs on both sides of the equation, including the cost of lost liberty to the detainee
(taken from Abram & Rohlfs), the personal costs of crime victimization (taken from the
studies discussed above), and the taxpayer expenses of administering jails and courts. Id. at
4–16. Perhaps because of the limitations of the Abrams & Rohlfs estimate, Baughman adds a
number of other costs to the “personal costs” borne by the detainee, including lost
employment, lost property and childcare expenses. Id. at 16–17.
114
Id. at 22. Baughman’s analysis is based on “134,767 randomly selected felony-arrest
cases between 1990 and 2006” from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ “State Court Processing
Statistics” data on felony prosecutions in the nation’s seventy-five largest jurisdictions. Id. at
10 n.46 and accompanying text.
115
Yang, supra note 80, at 1407. Yang uses data from Miami and Philadelphia and draws
on her own prior work estimating the casual effect of detention on case outcomes, future
employment, and future interaction with the criminal justice system.
116
Id. at 1435–37.
117
Id. at 1420.
118
We are aware of one prior effort at cost-benefit analysis of pretrial detention that does
not rely on monetization of the relevant costs and benefits: Larry Laudan & Ronald J.
Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 23, 29 (2010). Laudan and
113
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limitation of traditional cost-benefit analysis. Money is an unstable
metric. Its value depends on its context and the situation of the person
who possesses it. Converting the harms of both crime and incarceration
into dollar amounts in order to compare them introduces unnecessary
noise into the comparison. It can also introduce bias. If the costs of
incarceration are quantified on a group of people for whom money is very
dear—the poor—while the costs of crime are quantified using wealthier
respondents, the scale is tilted.
II. RELATIVE HARM VALUATION
We were sitting in the office one day, discussing the difficulty of
determining when detention produces net benefit, when one of us asked:
“Well, how long would you sit in jail to avoid getting robbed?” It struck
both of us as a provocative question. We wanted to know what other
people thought. We decided to ask. Using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,
an online platform that enables hiring people to perform short tasks, we
surveyed roughly 900 respondents on the amount of time they would be
willing to spend in jail rather than be the victim of various crimes. We
called our unconventional survey method “relative harm valuation.” Over
the course of the project, we learned that a few other scholars have
independently arrived at the same methodology.119 Most recently, legal
Allen focus on those charged with violent felonies and rely primarily on BJS data from felony
cases in the nation’s seventy-five largest urban jurisdictions between 1990 and 2004. They
argue that current release rates for this group produce excessive rates of violent pretrial crime,
and that we could achieve much greater net benefit by detaining all those charged with violent
felonies who also have a serious criminal history. Id. at 34–41. Unfortunately, it is not possible
to replicate the authors’ numerical calculations based on the sources the article cites.
119
Jane Bambauer & Andrea Roth, From Damage Caps to Decarceration: Extending Tort
Law Safeguards to Criminal Sentencing, 101 B.U. L. Rev. 1667, 1705–06 (2021) (using a
RHV survey to assess the relative harm of crime victimization and incarceration in order to
determine when punishment is “grossly excessive”); Douglas Mossman & Kathleen J. Hart,
How Bad Is Civil Commitment? A Study of Attitudes Toward Violence and Involuntary
Hospitalization, 21 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 181, 181 (1993) (survey study asking
undergraduate and medical students whether they would prefer to be attacked by a man with
a knife or spend a certain amount of time as a patient in a state psychiatric hospital); Nicolas
Scurich, Criminal Justice Policy Preferences: Blackstone Ratios and the Veil of Ignorance, 26
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. Online 23, 23 (2015) (survey study eliciting the relative cost that
respondents assigned to a wrongful conviction for assault versus being the victim of an
assault). The technique also bears a loose kinship to Paul Robinson’s survey research on
“empirical desert.” See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice:
Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2007); Paul H.
Robinson, Joshua Samuel Barton, & Matthew Lister, Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention,

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

Pretrial Detention and the Value of Liberty

739

scholars Jane Bambauer and Andrea Roth have used a similar method to
estimate when carceral punishment becomes “excessive” for
constitutional purposes.120 To our knowledge, no other scholar has yet
applied it to pretrial detention. We thus present our study as an exemplar
of a novel empirical technique that is gaining academic currency, applied
in a context to which it is particularly well suited: determining when
preventive detention averts greater harm than it inflicts.
A. The Method
Our method presumes that there are two costs in the preventive
detention calculus that swamp all the others. The first is the cost of crime
to the crime victim. The second is the cost of detention to the detainee. If
we can weigh these costs against one another, we can develop rough but
useful estimates of the risk threshold at which pretrial preventive
detention could be cost-justified. In other words, we posit that, to be costjustified, detention must—at a minimum—avert greater harm to crime
victims than it inflicts on detainees. This is an admittedly reductive
formula. Yet we think that it captures the core tradeoff that preventive
detention entails. We detain, at great personal cost to the detainee, to
avoid harmful acts, primarily in the interest of those who would be
harmed. Our survey method requires respondents to compare these two
central harms directly against each other.
Asking respondents to compare detention against criminal
victimization has two advantages over traditional contingent-valuation
surveys. First, it avoids the need to quantify each harm in dollars. As
noted above, the cost-of-crime literature demonstrates that people give
widely divergent answers when asked to price some experience in
monetary terms.121 On the other hand, people give highly consistent
answers when asked to rank different experiences in terms of personal
cost.122 Paul Robinson’s “empirical desert” surveys have documented
similar patterns: there is no consensus among respondents about the
appropriate sentence for any given offense, but respondents rank offenses
by severity quite consistently.123 This phenomenon suggests that asking
and Limiting Retributivism: A Reply, 17 New Crim. L. Rev. 312, 312 (2014). The other three
studies to deploy RHV surveys found results quite similar to ours. See infra note 141.
120
Bambauer & Roth, supra note 119, at 1667.
121
See supra notes 103–19 and accompanying text.
122
See supra notes 103–19 and accompanying text.
123
Robinson & Darley, supra note 119, at 9–10; Robinson et al., supra note 119, at 336–37.
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people to compare the experiences of crime and jail against each other is
likely to produce more meaningful information than asking people to
quantify the harm of each experience independently.
The second advantage of the method is that it requires people to
imagine themselves experiencing both types of harms. This avoids the
danger that the cost assessor might discount a harm because, consciously
or unconsciously, she imagines it befalling only a vague and unappealing
other. If we asked people to rate the harms of incarceration in more
abstract terms, they might imagine the incarcerated person as Black,
Brown, and/or poor. They might assume that this person had committed
a crime. It would be difficult to disentangle the respondents’ judgments
about the harm of incarceration from their race or class bias, let alone their
judgments about culpability and desert.
In asking people to imagine themselves in different situations, our
survey operates on a logic that echoes John Rawls’ theory of justice.
Rawls famously posited that just social policy is that which a person
would adopt in the “original position,” where “no one knows his place in
society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune
in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and
strength, and the like.”124 Our survey method does not place respondents
behind the figurative “veil of ignorance,” but it does, like Rawls, aspire
to detach normative analysis from self-interest by having respondents
imagine themselves as both crime victim and detainee.125
An observant reader will note that our survey is actually a form of
contingent valuation. Traditional contingent valuation studies ask people
how much they would pay to avoid crime victimization, or to reduce the
probability of being victimized by a certain amount. Our survey differs
only in that it asks respondents to “price” crime victimization in jail days
rather than dollars.
Finally, some readers may wonder why we should query lay people
about the relative costs of crime victimization and jail detention rather
than some set of experts—criminal justice system experts, say, or

124

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 118 (2d ed. 1999).
For this reason, two prior RHV studies explicitly used Rawlsian terminology to describe
the RHV approach. Mossman & Hart, supra note 119, at 185; Scurich, supra note 119. We
initially termed our method “Rawlsian cost-benefit analysis,” but we abandoned this
formulation because, as helpful critics noted, we are not asking respondents to engage in a
full-fledged Rawlsian policy analysis, but only to judge the relative subjective “badness” of
two specified events.
125
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economists with expertise in cost-benefit analysis.126 The answer is that it
is precisely the judgments of lay people that matter. What we need to
understand, in order to determine when the benefit of detention outweighs
its cost, is how bad the experience of crime victimization is relative to the
experience of jail detention. And those costs are a function of the
subjective experience of ordinary people. Experts have no special
purchase on how awful it is to suffer incarceration or be the victim of a
crime. The one group that might have particular insight are those who
have actually experienced these harms. We break out the responses of that
group in our results and discuss them below.
B. The Surveys
To implement the relative harm valuation, we conducted an online
survey on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. We conducted three separate
surveys to price incarceration against three serious crimes: robbery,
burglary, and aggravated assault. (Since the term “aggravated assault”
may not be familiar to a lay audience, we use the term “serious assault”
instead.) The three surveys are identical except for the crime names and
definitions. We use the survey on robbery as an example in this Section.
Each survey has three parts. The first part asks participants to envision
the experiences of incarceration and crime-victimization. The primary
purpose of this section is to ensure that respondents have thought carefully
about both experiences, making them salient for the purposes of
comparison. We refer to these as our “priming” questions, and they are
presented below (the order is randomized in the survey)127:

126

This is a question we have repeatedly fielded.
A reader who is interested in taking the survey herself may do so at the following links
for burglary, robbery, and serious assault, respectively. https://virginia.az1.qualtrics.com
/jfe/form/SV_bPoQ8VfJ6tZVdXf [https://perma.cc/KBV4-XMKD], https://virginia.az1.qual
trics.com/jfe/form/SV_4GXgcbe1aS7sL5P [https://perma.cc/4KE3-3J2G], https://virginia.az
1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_8BVHkIaG86DBxAN [https://perma.cc/P9TR-NK6Y].
127
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For each offense, we provide the Uniform Crime Report (“UCR”)
definition in parentheses.128 We also provide a few narrowing
stipulations. For robbery, we stipulate that no one gets seriously injured.
(A robbery in which someone gets seriously injured would effectively be
two offenses: robbery and aggravated assault.) For serious assault, we
stipulate that no one dies and that the assault is not so grave as to amount
to attempted murder. (Otherwise, the offense would be murder or
attempted murder, not aggravated assault.) For burglary, we specify that
no one is home at the time the burglary takes place. (The residents are not
home for the large majority of residential burglaries; in addition, we
wanted at least one offense with no face-to-face contact with the
perpetrator.)
The second part is the survey core. We begin by asking respondents to
make a binary choice between two unpleasant experiences: being the
victim of a crime or spending a certain amount of time in jail. The amount
of time is randomized between three options: one week, one month, or
three months.129 Below is an example:

128
The UCR definition of aggravated assault is “[a]n unlawful attack by one person upon
another wherein the offender uses a dangerous weapon or displays it in a threatening manner
or the victim suffers obvious severe or aggravated bodily injury, or where there was a risk for
serious injury/intent to seriously injure,” and the UCR definition of burglary is “unlawful entry
with intent to commit a larceny or felony.” See U.S. Dep’t of Just., 2021.1 National IncidentBased Reporting System User Manual 17 (2021), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ucr/ucr2019-1-nibrs-user-manua-093020.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/9ZEL-FUYZ].
129
The time periods were based on the distribution of responses in a test survey.
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If the respondent chooses jail time over the robbery, they are presented
with a second binary-choice option where the amount of time is randomly
selected to be either six months, one year or five years. However, if the
respondent chooses the robbery over jail, their next binary-choice option
has shorter jail times: one hour, one day or three days. For example:

These binary-choice questions are designed to be useful steppingstones on the way to our ultimate question: how much jail time is
equivalent, in terms of harm, to a robbery? We expect the binary questions
to be easier to answer than the more open-ended question. They also
might help resolve potential doubts about whether the two types of harms
can be meaningfully compared. For instance, virtually all of our
respondents reported that they would choose burglary over five years in
jail. And virtually all of our respondents reported that they would choose
one hour in jail over robbery. At least in these extreme examples,
respondents can easily and consistently choose between options.
Once the participants have completed two binary-choice questions,
they confront the main question of our survey:

Following this question, we ask participants to provide a brief one-or twosentence explanation of their answer. This is mostly for diagnostic
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purposes, to evaluate whether respondents have read and understood the
question.
Part three of the survey collects background information. We ask
whether the participant or anyone close to them has ever been a victim of
a robbery or spent time in jail or prison. We also collect demographic
information: age, race, ethnicity, income, and education.
We used three methods to filter out survey responses that do not reflect
a good-faith effort to answer the questions.130 First, we dropped any
respondent who left the two initial priming questions blank or wrote
something non-responsive. Second, we dropped any respondent who was
inconsistent across the binary-choice questions and the open-answer
question. An inconsistent respondent would, for example, choose robbery
over one week in jail but then state that robbery was as bad as six months
in jail.131 Third, we dropped anyone whose explanation for their final
answer demonstrated that they had misinterpreted the question to ask how
much punishment was warranted for the crime in question.132 Since the
first and third attention check entail some subjectivity, we asked two
research assistants to read the survey responses, and dropped only those
responses that both research assistants flagged for removal. Dropping
these responses changes the distribution of results somewhat but does not
qualitatively affect the main takeaway from our study. Appendix A
includes examples of dropped responses.

130

Studies commonly insert an “attention check” question, the sole purpose of which is to
verify that respondents are reading the prompts.
131
More formally, inconsistency is defined as choosing crime-victimization over a certain
amount of jail time in one of the binary choice questions, but then stating that crimevictimization is equally as bad as a longer period of time.
132
The survey we describe here is the result of several rounds of iteration. Our first survey
was conducted in 2016, also on Mechanical Turk. It was similar to this one in structure, and
the results were similar as well. In our second round, we appended a single question—the open
answer question that asks how much time is equally as bad as crime victimization—to a survey
that was implemented by RAND. Our goal was to reach a nationally representative sample,
but ultimately we think this iteration was not a success. Our question wound up sandwiched
in between a series of questions on dental hygiene. Without the priming and binary-choice
questions described above, we could not feel confident that the respondents were giving our
question the consideration we wanted them to, particularly when it came after such unrelated
material. Furthermore, without the priming and binary-choice questions we no longer had an
attention check that allowed us to drop results from people who were not answering in good
faith.
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C. Survey Results
We collected responses until we had a sample of about 300 respondents
per offense type after dropping those who had failed the attention
check.133 Table 1 shows responses to our primary survey question. The
mode is the most common response; the twenty-fifth percentile is defined
so that 25% of responses are less than or equal to it; the fiftieth percentile
is the middle response, also known as the median, and so forth.
More than half of respondents stated that a single day in jail would be
as bad as being the victim of a burglary, and more than half of respondents
stated that spending three days in jail is as bad as being the victim of a
robbery. When asked to explain this response, many people noted that,
however unpleasant, a robbery or burglary occurs quickly and is over. For
example, one respondent stated, “In jail I lose all my freedom and have to
live with some very bad and dangerous people. Robberies are usually fast
crimes so they are over quickly.” People were more averse to the idea of
being the victim of a serious assault than a robbery or burglary.
Nonetheless, more than half of respondents thought that a month in jail
caused harms at least as grave as a serious assault.134 As one respondent
wrote, “The isolation and loneliness of being in jail for 1 month would
become unbearable.” Some respondents also noted that incarceration
could also lead to an assault: “While being assaulted would have serious
consequences, being in jail for any length of time may result in more than
one serious assault.”135 The most common response, across all three
offense categories, was that a single day in jail would be as bad as or
worse than being the victim of a crime.

133

Each respondent was only permitted to complete a single survey.
Although the purpose of our study is not to produce dollar-value estimates of the liberty
cost of detention, we note that it is simple to convert our estimates into dollar-value terms,
given the existing economics literature estimating the cost of crime victimization in dollars.
We can combine our contingent valuation results with the cost-of-crime estimates from prior
literature to generate monetary estimates of the cost of detention for the detainee. For example,
the median respondent says that a month in jail is equivalent to a serious assault. One midrange estimate of the cost of serious assault is $42,646. See supra note 105 and accompanying
test. Our survey thus suggests that one month of jail has a personal cost to the detainee of
$42,646. Needless to say, this is considerably higher than the Abrams & Rolfs estimate of
$1,000 for ninety days.
135
If we included the respondents who failed the attention check, the median response would
be two months for serious assault, three days for burglary, and seven days for robbery.
134
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Table 1: Distribution of Responses to the Question “How Much
Time in Jail is as Bad as Being the Victim of a [Crime]?”
th

10 percentile
25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Mode136
# of responses

Assault
1 day
5 days
1 month
6 months
3.5 years
1 day
297

Robbery
1 hour
6 hours
3 days
2 weeks
1 month
1 day
290

Burglary
1 hour
5 hours
1 day
1 week
2 months
1 day
321

Although most respondents selected relatively short lengths of time, a
few reported crime-equivalent jail times that are many times longer than
the median respondent. This may simply be due to noise: despite our
attention checks, some people are responding thoughtlessly, or are
answering a different question. For instance, one respondent who reported
having been the victim of a serious assault said that being the victim of a
serious assault was equally as bad as spending ninety-nine years in jail.
When asked to explain this response, she said “A victim of assault with
live [sic] this problem for the rest of their lives.” It is possible that she
believes that spending the rest of one’s life in jail is preferable to having
to live with the aftermath of a serious assault. But it is also possible that
her answer was simply another way of saying, “It was really bad” or “I
think people who assault others should be punished harshly.”
Some variation in responses is to be expected, but variation would be
particularly important if it demonstrated systematically different views
among those who have actually experienced incarceration or crimevictimization and so are better informed about their costs. Table 2 breaks
the responses out by subgroup, including those who have personal
experience with either crime victimization or incarceration.137

136

In calculating the mode, we round each response up to the nearest day.
“Experienced with crime victimization” means that either the respondent or someone
close to them has been the victim of the type of crime that is the focus of their survey (assault,
robbery, or burglary). “Experienced with incarceration” means that either the respondent or
someone close to them has spent time in jail or prison.
137
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Assault
Robbery Burglary
Respondents experienced with crime victimization
Median
1 month
3 days
1 day
Mode
1 day
1 day
1 day
# of responses
86
130
157
Respondents experienced with incarceration
Median
1 month
3 days
1 day
Mode
1 day
1 day
1 day
# of responses
101
117
118
Black respondents
Median
3 weeks
3 days
1 day
Mode
1 day
1 day
1 day
# of responses
36
25
30
White respondents
Median
1 month
3 days
1 day
Mode
1 day
1 day
1 day
# of responses
231
224
255
Female respondents
Median
1 month
2 days
1 day
Mode
1 day
1 day
1 day
# of responses
126
112
168
Male respondents
Median
1 month
3 days
1.75 days
Mode
1 day
1 day
1 day
# of responses
170
173
152
Employed respondents
Median
1 month
3 days
1 day
Mode
1 day
1 day
1 day
# of responses
263
248
279
Unemployed respondents
Median
6 months 3 days
2 days
Mode
1 day
1 day
1 day
# of responses
21
30
31
College graduates
Median
1 month
2 days
1 day
Mode
1 day
1 day
1 day

747

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

748

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:709

# of responses
181
165
206
Respondents with no college degree
Median
1 month
5 days
3 days
Mode
1 day
1 day
1 day
# of responses
116
125
115
Both the median and the modal responses for experienced respondents
are exactly identical to the full sample. There is no evidence that
evaluations of the relative harms of crime victimization and incarceration
are meaningfully different for those who have first-hand experience
compared to those who do not. Responses are also remarkably similar
across race, gender, employment, and education status. Respondents who
are unemployed or lack a college degree tend to be slightly less averse to
incarceration relative to crime victimization, but the differences are not
substantial.138 This helps ease concern about the Mechanical Turk sample
being non-representative.139 If responses are consistent across
demographic groups within our study, then we expect them to be
relatively consistent across groups outside of our study too.
D. The Risk Threshold for Pretrial Detention
Translating the survey responses into a risk threshold for pretrial
detention requires just a few more steps. First, we need to select a metric
to summarize the distribution of responses. The two logical candidates are
the mean and the median. The mean is not ideal because it is easily
skewed by outlier responses; if a single respondent said that burglary was
equivalent to 1000 years in jail this would dramatically inflate the mean.
The median, on the other hand, is not affected by extreme outliers.
Another advantage of the median is that it is very close to the modal
response for robbery and burglary. Therefore, it not only captures the
138

The one instance in which the median response is substantially different is for
unemployed people answering the serious assault survey. However, this sub-sample is small,
and the difference is not statistically significant using quantile regression.
139
In terms of race and ethnicity, our respondents are not too dissimilar from the US
population. Our respondents are 78.1% White, 10% Black, and 7% Hispanic. In contrast, the
US population is 76.3% White, 13.4% Black, and 18.5% Hispanic. Quick Facts, U.S. Census
Bureau (July 1, 2019) https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
[https://perma.cc/R9ZP-4KUR]. They are, however, slightly more likely to be male (55%) and
young. The median age was 36 and only 4% of our sample was older than 65. They also report
being more educated than the average adult: 61% report being a college graduate, compared
to 32.1% of the adult population in the United States. Id.
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“middle” response, but also is close to the most frequent response for
those crime types.
Taking the median respondent as our metric, one month of detention
imposes harms as grave as serious assault. Three days of detention
imposes harms as grave as robbery. And even a single day of detention
imposes harms as grave as burglary. We can now evaluate what type of
risk might justify pretrial detention.
If we detain those with a 50% chance of committing serious assault
within a month for one month each, we sacrifice two months of liberty for
every serious assault we expect to prevent. On the basis of our median
respondent, that tradeoff is not cost-justified. Detention might be justified,
however, for someone with a 50% chance of committing serious assault
within the next two weeks, if we limited detention to two weeks. In that
case, we would sacrifice only thirty days of liberty for every averted
assault. A 50% chance of committing a serious assault within two weeks
is thus one way of describing the risk-threshold for pretrial detention that
the survey generates: only those whose risk of serious assault is higher
than 50% within two weeks could possibly be detained with net benefit.
As a reminder, the risk threshold is only a lower bound on the risk level
that justifies detention in consequentialist terms. Within the
consequentialist framework, those whose risk is below the threshold
should never be detained. Those whose risk is above it are candidates for
detention, but detention is still not necessarily cost-justified. First,
detention is not cost-justified if less-restrictive alternatives can produce
comparable or greater net benefit by sufficiently reducing the risk of
crime at lower cost to liberty. Second, the early days of incarceration are
likely to impose the most serious costs, due both to the psychological
adjustment and to the disruption to employment, housing status, childcare
arrangements, and other life circumstances. Detaining two different
people for two weeks each likely creates greater harm than detaining a
single person for one month—and therefore greater harm than the serious
assault that it is expected to avert.
Even as a lower bound, though, the risk threshold that emerges from
the RHV survey is very high. Someone who is expected to commit crimes
as grave as serious assault within thirty days, crimes as grave as robbery
within three days, or crimes as grave as burglary within a single day, is
extraordinarily high-risk. As we discuss in Part III, it is extremely difficult
to identify people who pose that degree of risk. If the justification for
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pretrial preventive detention really is a matter of consequentialist harmbalancing, such detention is rarely justified.140
The extremity of this risk threshold is a function of just how awful—
how costly—people believe it is to go to jail.141 To be jailed is to lose
one’s freedom and dignity. It is to be isolated from family and friends.
And contemporary American jails are not pleasant places. They are rife
with violence and disease, quotidian humiliation, and pervasive fear.
Whereas a crime victim has at least the sympathy of family, neighbors,
and employers, a jail detainee must endure their anger and distrust. A
person hospitalized with an injury can still communicate freely with the
outside world. Not so a person in jail, which is one reason that even a few
days in jail can cost a person his job, housing, and custody of his
children.142 In abstract policy discussions it is easy to forget just how
140
Not only is detention unjustified according to Salerno’s consequentialist framework if
the harm to liberty outweighs the benefit in security; it might veer into pretrial punishment.
The Supreme Court has held that a pretrial deprivation of liberty becomes punishment when
it is “excessive” in relation to the goal that it seeks to achieve. United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 747 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). If detention inflicts more
harm than it averts, it is arguably excessive in relation to its goal of preventing harm. Cf.
Bambauer & Roth, supra note 119, at 1667, 1676 (arguing that punishment that inflicts more
than ten times the harm of the crime for which it is imposed is “grossly excessive” for
constitutional purposes).
141
Interestingly, the other studies to have deployed RHV surveys have found similar results.
The median respondent in the survey conducted by Bambauer and Roth stated that aggravated
assault was equivalent to one month in jail and burglary was equivalent to an hour or less in
jail. Bambauer and Roth, supra note 119, at 1713. Mossman and Hart were surprised to learn
that “over a fourth of the undergraduates expressed an implicit preference for being attacked
over undergoing a three-day hospitalization in a public psychiatric facility,” and that the
medical students’ “aversion to involuntary hospitalization was nearly as great as the
undergraduates.’” Mossman & Hart, supra note 119, at 193. Scurich found that 75% of
participants would rather be violently assaulted than convicted of violent assault. Scurich,
supra note 119, at 29. Among that group, the median respondent equated five false negatives
with one false positive, which Scurich interpreted to mean that they “prefer to be violently
assaulted 5 times [rather] than spend a single day in prison.” Id. at 30–31. Even among
respondents who would prefer to be convicted of violent assault over being assaulted, the
median respondent “would prefer to spend 30 days in prison [rather] than be violently
assaulted” but would presumably prefer victimization over longer periods of incarceration. Id.
at 31.
142
See, e.g., Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Unable to post his bail,
Curry . . . . missed the birth of his only child, lost his job, and feared losing his home and
vehicle. Ultimately, he pled nolo contendere in order to return home.”); Nick Pinto, The Bail
Trap, N.Y. Times (Aug. 13, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1INtghe [https://perma.cc/AKV3-JN8X]
(reporting the story of a woman who, “five months after her arrest, . . . was still fighting in
family court to regain custody of her daughter”). Our empirical results also support arguments
that arrest is overused. Arrest is the initial detention decision and can often lead to a day or
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terrible a cost the system inflicts when it puts a person in jail. To our
survey respondents, this cost was very vivid.
E. Technical Objections
We do not present the RHV-derived risk threshold as the final answer
to the question of what risk justifies pretrial preventive detention. We
offer it instead as a proof of concept. One can, in a principled fashion,
develop estimates of the risk threshold for pretrial preventive detention.
The harms of crime victimization and incarceration may be different, but
they can be meaningfully compared. Unless we want to leave this calculus
in the hands of bail judges and risk-assessment tool developers, such
analysis must be done, and can be done. We believe, moreover, that our
survey yields estimates that are ballpark-correct. Granted, the method
intentionally simplifies a complicated determination. One can raise
numerous sensible objections to it. We do not think, however, that any of
these objections fundamentally change the central takeaway. We discuss
technical objections to the method below—claims that we have omitted
or miscalculated relevant costs and benefits. We consider objections to
our consequentialist framework in Part III.
1. Omitted Costs
Perhaps the most obvious potential objection is that the survey method
ignores manifold costs on both sides of the detention balance: the harms
that crimes inflict, indirectly, on victims’ families and communities, as
well as perpetrators’ families and communities and the similar harms that
incarceration inflicts. As noted above, however, we expect such costs to
exist on both sides of the balance. Crime harms the loved ones of those
who suffer it and so does detention. Crime can increase fear and lead
members of the community to invest in precautionary measures, even
those who have not been directly victimized. But pretrial detention can
also foment fear, and lead members of the community to take costly
precautionary measures to avoid interaction with police that might lead to
arrest. Both crime and incarceration impose indirect costs on taxpayers.

two in jail before the bail hearing. Given that a single day in jail produces harms as grave as
being the victim of a burglary, arrest requires substantial justification. Rachel Harmon, Why
Arrest?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 308–09 (2016).
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We see no reason to expect that incorporating additional costs would shift
the scale dramatically in either direction.143
A related objection is that relative harm valuation prioritizes individual
welfare costs over social welfare costs, and the response is similar. As the
survey responses illustrate, most respondents contemplated potential
harm to their careers and loved ones as they weighed the harm of criminal
victimization against the harm of incarceration. In this sense, RHV does
account for some social welfare costs. To the extent that the respondents’
assessments failed to account for broader social harms, we expect those
harms to accrue roughly equally on both sides of the balance.
2. Underspecified Harm
A second objection might be that the scenarios we ask each participant
to envision are underspecified. Does robbery include a gun pointed at
your head? Does aggravated assault result in permanent disability or
disfigurement? We do not say. It is therefore possible that different
participants are envisioning fundamentally different events.
The decision to leave the details of detention and crime largely
unspecified was intentional, however, and we see this as a strength rather
than a weakness of the survey design. The possible variation among the
experiences that our respondents envision is a useful reflection of reality.
Crime victimization and incarceration each encompass a wide range of
experiences. No two assaults are alike. We do not attempt to describe a
“median” instance of serious assault or incarceration because it does not
exist. Our method relies on the virtues of aggregation. We expect that the
participants’ responses reflect a variety of experiences and perspectives.
The median response should capture a median perspective within that
range.
3. Distorting Perceptions About Justice
A third potential objection is that, when considering the harms of
incarceration, respondents may be considering the justice of that

143
Another variant on the omitted-costs objection is that our survey respondents cannot truly
imagine the experience of criminal victimization because a central element of that experience
is the terror of being killed or seriously hurt (a scenario that our survey precludes). However,
it seems likely that a similar fear is equally central to the experience of jail detention, given
current jail conditions, and is equally precluded by our survey. So, again, we think this
limitation applies to both sides of the balance.
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experience in ways that distort their responses. For instance, a respondent
might imagine that she is being detained wrongfully or irrationally and
perceive that injustice to compound the costs of incarceration.
Alternatively, a respondent might imagine that she must have committed
some crime to warrant the incarceration and perceive the justice of her
detention to mitigate its cost.
As an empirical matter, respondents did not frequently report such
assumptions when describing the challenges of jail time or explaining
their responses. A few did, but by far the most frequently reported factors
in respondents’ deliberations were isolation, danger, stigma,
uncomfortable living conditions, separation from family, exposure to
other inmates, and job loss. If assumptions about the justice or injustice
of the detention did affect responses, they do not appear to have affected
responses very much. On a conceptual level, moreover, it is not clear that
respondents’ assumptions about the justice or injustice of their detention
should be understood as distorting. Detainees, after all, also perceive their
detention to be just or unjust, and that perception affects their experience.
Absent some indication that respondents’ perceptions about the justice of
their detention differ systematically from detainees’, such perceptions
should be included in assessing the costs of detention.
4. Jail is Less Bad for the Average Detainee
A last objection might be that jail is less bad for the average pretrial
detainee than the median person if pretrial detainees are more accustomed
to life disruptions or more in need of food and a place to sleep. A
principled cost-benefit analysis, the argument goes, should faithfully
weigh the liberty loss on an individualized basis, accounting for the
subjective experience of the deprivation.
Authorizing the state to incarcerate certain people for longer than
others because their poverty makes incarceration relatively less awful
raises thorny legal and moral questions. Principles of equality probably
prohibit the state from tailoring the pretrial detention decision in this
way.144 Allowing otherwise would open the door to race and class bias.
144
In fact, some might argue that we should raise the risk threshold for disadvantaged groups
in order to wind down disparities within the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq,
Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 Duke L.J. 1043, 1131 (2019) (arguing that,
where preventive coercion by law enforcement aims to prevent “less serious crime,” “the
existence of negative spillovers for black families and communities warrants a more stringent
risk threshold for the racial minority”).
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Moreover, the survey results produce no evidence that the harm of
incarceration varies substantially by race, class, or prior experience with
incarceration.145 Respondents who are unemployed, Black, or previously
incarcerated also report high levels of aversion to spending even a short
amount of time in jail.
III. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE
The very high risk-threshold that emerges from the RHV survey raises
two core questions. The first is when, if ever, we can identify risk that is
grave enough to warrant detention under the survey-derived standard. The
second is whether our basic premise—that the consequentialist analysis
must not discount the welfare of arrestees relative to crime victims—
might be misguided. This Part addresses those questions.
A. In Theory, Detention Is Rarely Justified
1. Statistical Risk Is Generally Insufficient
As bail reform gathered momentum, stakeholders placed a great deal
of hope in actuarial risk assessment tools as mechanisms to make pretrial
release and detention decisions. Hundreds of jurisdictions have now
adopted such tools.146 To build them, developers analyze large data sets
to identify correlations between case and defendant characteristics and
future offending (or some proxy for future offending, like arrest).147 Each
defendant receives a risk score based on their statistical likelihood of
future arrest. The instrument divides these scores into categories, often

145

See supra Table 2 and accompanying text. The one exception is that the median
unemployed respondent rated six months of jail, rather than one, as equivalent to suffering an
aggravated assault. The sample size for this group was quite small, however, and it is difficult
to tell if this variance is meaningful or is just noise.
146
Movement Alliance Project & MediaJustice, National Landscape: Mapping Pretrial
Injustice, Pretrial Risk https://pretrialrisk.com/national-landscape [https://perma.cc/9F5U9QTW] (last visited Oct. 31, 2021).
147
For additional background on pretrial risk assessment, see, e.g., Mayson, Dangerous
Defendants, supra note 10, at 507–16; Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in
Action, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 303, 314–17 (2018); Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism
Risk, 67 Emory L.J. 59, 67–72 (2017); Sarah L. Desmarais & Evan M. Lowder, Pretrial Risk
Assessment Tools: A Primer for Judges, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys. Safety & Just.
Challenge 4–6 (2019), http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/resource/pretrial-riskassessment-tools-a-primer-for-judges-prosecutors-and-defense-attorneys [https://perma.cc/J3
9Q-X3FP].
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“low risk,” “moderate risk,” and “high risk.”148 Actuarial risk assessment
tools are widely believed to be more accurate in predicting future
offending than human intuition, even the intuition of an experienced
judge.149
Can today’s pretrial risk assessment tools identify defendants who are
so dangerous as to require detention pursuant to our survey results? The
evidence is not promising.
The first problem is that most current tools assess the likelihood of
arrest for anything at all, including minor offenses.150 Given that our
median survey respondent deems a few days in jail to be as bad as being
robbed, it seems safe to posit that a risk of minor crime probably never
justifies detention. The likelihood of “any future arrest” is simply not
relevant to detention decisions.
Some pretrial risk assessment tools do assess the likelihood of arrest
for a violent offense, but even among those classified as high-risk, rates
of rearrest for violence are quite low. In one widely used risk assessment
tool, the PSA, defendants classified in the highest-risk category for “new
violent criminal activity” had a less than 4% rearrest rate for violence
during the pretrial period (six to nine months).151 For the COMPAS risk
assessment tool, only 2.5% of defendants in the highest risk group were
rearrested for a violent offense within a month; 8% were rearrested for a

148

A crucial step in implementing a risk assessment tool is determining what risk threshold
should divide the different categories. Let us say a jurisdiction recommends pretrial detention
only for defendants in the highest risk category. The risk assessment designer (and the task
force overseeing the process) must determine what statistical risk should separate the
moderate- from the high-risk category. This decision process is almost never conducted in a
transparent manner. Nonetheless, some process occurs, and at the end of the day, a decision is
made. See Eaglin, supra note 149, at 85–88 (explaining the process by which risk assessment
tool developers choose the “cut-off points” that create risk classifications).
149
Robyn M. Dawes, David Faust & Paul E. Meehl, Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment,
243 Science 1668, 1669 (1989), https://courses.washington.edu/pbafhall/514/514%20Readin
gs/clinical%20versus%20actuarial.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL4U-MFGS].
150
Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 509–14.
151
Matthew DeMichele, Peter Baumgartner, Michael Wenger, Kelle Barrick & Megan
Comfort, Public Safety Assessment: Predictive Utility and Differential Prediction by Race in
Kentucky, 19 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 409, 419 (2020). The pretrial period was between six
and nine months for most defendants. This study does not specify which crimes are included
in their measure of violent rearrest. Matthew DeMichele et al., The Public Safety Assessment:
A Re-Validation and Assessment of Predictive Utility and Differential Prediction by Race and
Gender in Kentucky 51 (Apr. 25, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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violent offense within six months.152 Other studies of pretrial risk
assessments report similarly low rates of violent recidivism.153
With such low rearrest rates for violent crime even within the highest
risk group, it appears unlikely that any existing pretrial tool is capable of
identifying the degree of risk that could justify detention. Our survey
found that one month of detention is as bad as an aggravated assault; to
be justified, one month of detention must avert at least one aggravated
assault. Detaining all those classified as high-risk for violence by the
COMPAS, for instance, is projected to avert only twenty-five violent
offenses for every thousand people detained for one month. This is the
equivalent of trading forty months of liberty to prevent one violent
offense. The average “violent offense,” moreover, is less serious than an
aggravated assault.154
152
Blomberg, supra note 21, at 22, 48–49 (defining “violent crimes” to include “murder,
manslaughter, sex offenses, robbery, assault, battery, or other crimes in which the description
indicates a person was harmed or under the threat of bodily injury”).
153
A study of the federal Pretrial Risk Assessment, for instance, found that 2.9% of those
classified in the highest-risk group were rearrested for a violent offense during the pretrial
period (11 months, on average). Thomas H. Cohen, Christopher T. Lowenkamp & William E.
Hicks, Revalidating the Federal Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (PTRA): A Research
Summary, 82 Fed. Prob. 23, 25–26 (2018). This study defined violent crimes to include
“homicide and related offenses, kidnapping, rape and sexual assault, robbery, and assault,”
both felony and misdemeanor. Id. at 25 (citing Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Alexander M.
Holsinger & Thomas H. Cohen, PCRA Revisited: Testing the Validity of the Federal Post
Conviction Risk Assessment (PCRA), 12 Psych. Servs. 149, 151 (2015)). We note that as this
article was approaching publication, two validation studies of the PSA in California were
released that documented much higher rates of rearrest for violent offenses among those
“flagged” as high-risk for violence. James Hess & Susan Turner, Validation of the PSA in Los
Angeles County 34 tbl.4.A.4.a (last updated 2021), https://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.ed
u/2021/02/03/validation-of-the-psa-in-los-angeles-county [https://perma.cc/RRU9-YPK4]
(reporting that approximately 36% of those scoring in the two highest risk brackets were
rearrested for a violent offense during the pretrial period); Alissa Skog & Johanna Lacoe,
Validation of the PSA in San Francisco 21 tbl.14 (2021), https://www.capolicylab.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/Validation-of-the-PSA-in-San-Francisco.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7E
J-X4V3] (reporting that 36% of those flagged for violence risk by the PSA were rearrested for
violence during the pretrial period).
154
The validation studies cited above define “violent offense” to include simple assault and
battery. See Blomberg, supra note 21, at 22; Advancing Pretrial Pol’y & Rsch., Guide to the
PSA Violent Offense List 5 (last updated 2020), https://advancingpretrial.org/guide/guide-tothe-psa-violent-offense-list/ [https://perma.cc/JV9V-6KK9]. They do not specify rates of
rearrest for different subsets of violent offenses. Considering that the arrest rate for simple
assault and battery is much higher than for other violent crimes, it stands to reason that the
average cost of the violent offenses represented in these studies is lower than the cost of
aggravated assault, robbery, or burglary. In other words, if incarcerating 1000 people for a
month averts twenty-five violent crimes, the harm of those crimes is expected to be less than
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It is true that rearrest rates in validation studies might understate the
number of crimes that the highest risk groups would actually commit
because validation studies suffer from selection bias. We only see the
pretrial rearrest rate for people who are not detained. Detained defendants
may pose a higher crime risk than those who are released; if courts are
judging risk accurately, this should be the case! The rearrest rate among
released defendants might therefore understate the statistical meaning of
a high-risk classification. Furthermore, the rearrest rate may understate
the true number of crimes, since not all offenses result in arrest.
In Appendix B, we conduct some back-of-the-envelope calculations to
estimate what the true rate of serious crime is for those classified in the
highest risk category for violent crime. We make a series of extreme
assumptions designed to favor detention, yet still find that a high-risk
classification does not indicate a degree of risk even close to severe
enough to justify pretrial detention.155 It is possible that our risk
assessment capacities could improve in the future. But no one should hold
their breath. Recent studies have found that complex machine-learning
algorithms do not usually offer large improvement over simple checkliststyle instruments with as few as two input variables.156 These studies
suggest that interaction between input factors is not especially important
to prediction,157 and that the marginal value of additional data is relatively

the harm of twenty-five serious assaults. See Unif. Crime Reporting Program, FBI, 2017
Crime in the United States, at tbl.35, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-theu.s.-2017/tables [https://perma.cc/AZR7-VBWY] (last visited Jan. 18, 2022) (reporting that
in 2017, the arrest rate for simple assault was three times as high as for aggravated assault,
five times as high as for burglary, twelve times as high as robbery, forty-seven times as high
as for rape, and ninety-five times as high as for murder).
155
If one were to combine all of our extremely conservative assumptions at once, pretrial
detention might be justified for the highest-risk category. However, we expect that these
conservative assumptions are much too conservative. See Appendix B.
156
See, e.g., Jongbin Jung, Connor Concannon, Ravi Shroff, Sharad Goel & Daniel G.
Goldstein, Simple Rules for Complex Decisions (Stan. Univ., Working Paper No. 978, 2017);
Elaine Angelino, Nicholas Larus-Stone, Daniel Alabi, Margo Seltzer & Cynthia Rudin,
Learning Certifiably Optimal Rule Lists for Categorical Data, 18 J. Mach. Learning Rsch.,
2018, at 1, 1; Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting
Recidivism, 4 Sci. Advances, Jan. 2018, at 1, 3.
157
For instance, consider the input factors of age and current charge. It might be the case
that age predicts future arrest differently for people charged with drug offenses than for people
charged with property offenses. Complex machine-learning algorithms can identify and learn
from such interactions in the data. If such interactions are substantial, machine learning
algorithms should substantially outperform the simpler tools. But they do not.
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low once a handful of important factors are accounted for.158 The best
available research suggests that future crime is simply hard to predict and
will remain so.
2. When Detention Is Warranted
The fact that contemporary risk assessment tools cannot justify pretrial
detention on their own does not mean that detention is never warranted.
As an initial matter, our survey results (and the risk threshold they
generate) presume status quo conditions of detention. The respondents
deemed even short stints in jail to be as bad as criminal victimization
because jail is a terrible place to be. With adequate political will, U.S.
jails could be substantially less awful. Minimizing the costs of detention
to detainees would lower the risk threshold that justifies detention.159
Even under status quo conditions, though, there are likely some cases that
meet the survey-derived risk threshold.
i. Murder, Rape, and Domestic Violence
We have thus far omitted the risk of murder, rape, or domestic violence
in our analysis. Murder and rape are extremely severe harms, and we
don’t expect our RHV survey method to function well for these types of
crimes. It is not meaningful to ask how long someone would stay in jail
to avoid being murdered; most everyone would agree to a lifetime. One
could ask respondents how much time they would spend in jail to
eliminate a given probability—say 10%—of being murdered, but then we
are heavily leaning on people’s ability to evaluate small risks. Rape poses
similar challenges, with the added difficulty that the boundaries of the
158
Age and criminal history are usually the best predictors of future crime. See Megan T.
Stevenson & Christopher Slobogin, Algorithmic Risk Assessments and the Double-Edged
Sword of Youth, 98 Wash. U. L. Rev. 681, 696 (2018).
159
In addition to improving conditions of confinement, we might consider compensating
detainees for non-punitive confinement. See generally Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A
Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1947, 1979–82 (2005)
(proposing that the criminal justice system should compensate pretrial detainees to account
for their costs); Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem
of Preventive Detention, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 778, 814 (1996) (“It would thus seem
both fair and efficient to compensate [a person preventively detained] for the loss of [his
freedom]—fair because he is paying out of his own resources to prevent harm to others and
efficient because if he is compensated the community will not be likely to squander his
freedom without justification.”); Zina Makar, Unnecessary Incarceration, 98 Or. L. Rev. 607,
611 (2020) (advocating compensation for pretrial detention).
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crime itself are deeply contested.160 Domestic violence, meanwhile,
differs from most other crime in that any given incident often belongs to
an ongoing pattern of abuse.161 The harms to the victim encompass the
experience of living in an abusive relationship.162 Considering the costs
of one incident in isolation, as we do with burglary, robbery, and assault,
would tend to understate its harm.
That being said, one could easily extend our framework to include such
offenses if one were willing to make an assumption about how the harms
of these crimes compare to the ones analyzed here. For instance, if one
were to assume that rape imposes harms that are ten times as grave as
serious assault, then it could be justified to detain someone for a month if
they pose a 10% risk of committing rape within a month if not detained.
At this point we are not prepared to make such assumptions. We allow
that there are likely instances in which people pose a grave enough risk
of murder, rape, or domestic violence to justify pretrial detention. Exactly
how many, we do not know. But we expect that only a minority of pretrial
detainees are being held based on risks as specific as these. Most, we
expect, are being held based on a much more nebulous conception of
crime-risk.
ii. Case-Specific Evidence of Risk
Risk assessment tools are not perfect, but there is broad consensus that
they can predict future offending better than human beings.163 If risk
assessment tools cannot identify a group of defendants who meet the risk
threshold, judges will generally not be able to either.
Yet courts may sometimes be able to identify individuals who present
a substantial enough risk to warrant preventive detention on the basis of
the particular facts of a case. Imagine a person charged with attempting
to assault a man he believes to have slept with his wife. The defendant
has repeatedly vowed to hurt this man at the first opportunity. He has a
record of violence. He has little to lose. He goes so far as to tell the court
that there is nothing the court can do, short of killing him; whenever he
160

See, e.g., Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 881,
885 (2016).
161
Cora Peterson et al., Lifetime Economic Burden of Intimate Partner Violence Among
U.S. Adults, 55 Am. J. Preventive Med. 433, 434 (2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC6161830 [https://perma.cc/FY3F-SMTJ].
162
Id.
163
Dawes, supra note 149, at 1669–70.
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gets out, he will exact his revenge.164 He does not intend to kill his rival,
just to seriously injure him. The court might justifiably conclude, in this
scenario, that there is something like a 75% chance of this man
committing a serious assault within a week of release. That degree of risk
might justify detention for that week. If, at the end of the week, the degree
of risk remained as high, it would justify detention for another week.
Continued detention might be justified until adjudication.
We expect instances of case-specific risk that are substantial enough to
warrant preventive detention to be exceedingly rare. Take our
hypothetical defendant. If the most precise risk we can articulate is a 75%
chance of serious assault within thirty days, it does not warrant preventive
detention for thirty days under the survey risk-threshold. If there is less
than 100% certainty that the assault will actually happen within a month,
the projected harms of detention for the potential assailant outweigh the
projected benefits of averted crime for the potential victim.
This application of the analysis defies common moral intuitions. One’s
instinct is to say that the would-be assailant should be detained in order
to avert the harm that he threatens. Where have we gone wrong?
Let us change the story slightly. Imagine that a defendant, Abe, has
promised to assault someone named Carlos unless James, an innocent
third party, is placed in jail for thirty days. Is it justifiable to detain James
to avert the assault on Carlos? Here the intuitive answer is different. We
venture to suggest that most people would feel that detaining James is not
justified.
We surmise that the reason it feels justified to detain Abe, but not
James, in order to prevent an assault on Carlos is because the risk that
Abe poses makes us care less about his well-being.165 In the cost-benefit

164

These hypothetical facts very loosely recall the situation in Hendricks, in which the
(convicted) defendant told the court “that the only sure way he could keep from sexually
abusing children in the future was ‘to die.’ ” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997).
165
In philosophical terms, one might intuit that Abe is culpable for threatening the harm; he
has forfeited his right against preventive confinement, see Walen, A Punitive Precondition,
supra note 79, at 1230; he is a “[c]ulpable [a]ggressor” who we may justifiably restrain on
Carlos’ behalf, see Ferzan, Beyond Crime, supra note 79, at 160; he has incurred a duty to
dispel the threat, see Duff, supra note 78, at 13; Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral
Foundations of Criminal Law 268–72 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011); or perhaps he should even
be subject to punishment for his culpable act, see Douglas Husak, Lifting the Cloak:
Preventive Detention as Punishment, 48 San Diego L. Rev. 1173, 1992 (2011). Alternately,
the intuition may be that detaining James to protect Carlos violates the Kantian prohibition on
using people purely as a means. E.g., Samuel Kerstein, Treating Persons as Means, Stan.
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analysis, we discount the harm that he would suffer from incarceration.
We do not care as much that he may feel frustrated, powerless, bored, and
afraid. It does not bother us that he may be eating gray baloney and
sleeping with cockroaches. We have judged Abe to be at fault, and his
discomforts weigh little on our conscience. This scenario takes us to the
question of whether it is permissible to discount arrestees’ well-being in
a cost-benefit calculus, as we are inclined to discount Abe’s.
B. Discounting Arrestees’ Well-Being
Our surveys suggest that preventive detention should be exceedingly
rare. Yet, on any given day, there are almost 500,000 people detained
pretrial in the United States.166 And these “moment in time” numbers
understate the number of individuals who experience pretrial detention,
because more than ten million people cycle through the jails annually.167
Current statistics do not disclose what fraction of them are detained
pretrial, or for how long, but the number is likely to be in the millions.
The reasons for pretrial detention vary. Some people are detained to
prevent flight or evidence-tampering. Others might be detained
inadvertently because they were unable to pay the bail amount set.
Nonetheless, we expect that a substantial portion of those detained each
year (including those held on unaffordable bail) are detained due to
concerns about crime-risk. Public discourse around pretrial detention has
focused largely on public safety, suggesting that, at least in the public
mind, crime risk is an important justification for detention rates.168 Judges
frequently cite danger to the community when setting high bail or denying
bond.169
What accounts for the disconnect between theory and practice? Our
hypothesis is that pretrial detention rates are high—and will remain high
in the absence of constraints—in large part because judges, lawmakers,
and ordinary citizens discount the well-being of potential detainees
relative to the well-being of potential crime victims. This relative
indifference can manifest itself in a judge’s high bail decision, in press
Encyc. of Phil. (Apr. 13, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/personsmeans [https://perma.cc/3CR4-YQGJ].
166
Zeng, supra note 22, at 5 tbl.3.
167
Id. at 1.
168
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
169
See, e.g., Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, supra note 24, at 1663–64 (citing State
v. Anderson, 127 A.3d 100, 107 (Conn. 2015)).
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coverage that erupts in outrage every time a person on pretrial release
commits a crime while remaining silent on most instances of detention,
and in the laws and incentive structures that policymakers construct for
the pretrial process.
The impulse to privilege crime victims over (possible) past and future
crime perpetrators is understandable, but it is important to try to
disentangle the grounds for discounting the costs of detention to detainees
in order to assess whether they are sound. The discussion that follows
evaluates four distinct arguments that our conceptual framework and
survey method are misguided in valuing the welfare of arrestees by the
same standard as the welfare of potential crime victims. Each argument
claims that the harm of detention to detainees should be systematically
discounted in some way for purposes of the cost-benefit analysis.
1. Time Served
A first argument is that our survey results overstate the cost of pretrial
detention because, in reality, the time that people spend detained before
trial will be credited toward any jail or prison sentence they receive.170
There are three problems with this proposition. First, discounting
someone’s well-being in the present on the grounds that they may be
convicted in the future looks a lot like pretrial punishment. Second, many
detained defendants are not convicted or are not sentenced to
incarceration; their time in detention is not credited toward anything.171
Third, discounting the costs of detention on the “time-served” basis does
not even make sense in a consequentialist framework. If crediting pretrial
detention toward punishment reduces its costs, it also reduces its benefits.
Imagine a hypothetical defendant, Amy, whose pretrial detention is
credited against her sentence of one year’s incarceration. Given that Amy
would have spent a year incarcerated regardless, whatever benefit her
detention had—whatever crime it averted—is a benefit that her sentence
would have produced in any case. One year’s imprisonment is one year’s
imprisonment whether it begins in July or October. If one treats Amy’s
170

Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 549–51 (analyzing this basis for
discounting the value of pretrial detainees’ liberty).
171
See Colin Starger, The Argument that Cries Wolfish, MIT Computational Law Report
(Aug. 14, 2020), https://law.mit.edu/pub/theargumentcrieswolfish/release/2 [https://perma.c
c/4F85-7NH3] (finding that in 7% of all cases filed in Maryland District Court in Baltimore
City between 2013–2017, defendants were detained pretrial and subsequently had their cases
dropped prior to adjudication).
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detention as cost-free for purposes of the analysis because it gets absorbed
into her punishment, one must also treat it as benefit-free. Her detention
simply drops out of the cost-benefit calculus altogether.172 This is
conceptually coherent, after all; her detention has been converted into
punishment, such that neither its costs nor its benefits belong in a costbenefit analysis of regulatory pretrial detention.173
Finally, it seems worth noting the perversity of the time-served
argument given that many “time-served” sentences are, in fact, a direct
result of pretrial detention.174 When a person is detained on minor charges
prosecutors will typically offer a sentence of “time served” if the person
pleads guilty. The incentive is overwhelming, even if the person might
have fought the charges if she had been at liberty. People plead guilty to
go home. A not-insignificant number of people whose detention is
ultimately credited toward their sentence of incarceration would not have
received a sentence of incarceration at all had they not been detained—or
would have received a shorter one.175 To treat pretrial detention as costless
in these cases is to allow detention to justify itself. Detention produces a
172

See Yang, supra note 80, at 1432–33 (“[I]f a defendant would be incarcerated post-trial
regardless of pre-trial detention, and the defendant is given credit for time spent in jail pretrial, the gains from reducing pre-trial crime are merely shifted forward in time and should
generally not be included in a cost-benefit analysis.”).
173
It is actually possible that the effects of a year’s incarceration might vary to some extent
on the basis of the timing of the incarceration (i.e., pretrial or postconviction). It is not clear
to us, however, that serving some of the year pretrial would necessarily entail more benefit
and less cost than serving it all post-conviction, rather than more cost and less benefit.
174
As a growing body of empirical scholarship has demonstrated, pretrial detention causally
increases the likelihood of conviction, the likelihood of a carceral sentence, and the expected
length of the sentence. Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial
Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly
Assigned Judges, 108 Am. Econ. Rev. 201, 203, 225, 234–37 (2018); Arpit Gupta, Christopher
Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge
Randomization, 45 J. Legal Stud. 471, 472–76 (2016); Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan
Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L.
Rev. 711, 714–15 (2017); Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial
Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & Econ.
529, 530–31 (2017); Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail
Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J.L. Econ. & Org. 511, 512–13, 537 (2018); Christopher T.
Lowenkamp, Marie VanNostrand & Alexander Holsinger, The Hidden Costs of Pretrial
Detention 4 (2013) (associating longer pretrial detention period with increased failure to
appear and new criminal activity pending trial; associating pretrial detention lasting two or
more days with probability of post-disposition recidivism).
175
Heaton, supra note 174, at 715, 767–68 (empirical study finding that misdemeanor
pretrial detention causally increases the likelihood of conviction and of receiving a custodial
sentence).
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carceral sentence that justifies detention! It is dazzling alchemy, but it is
perverse.
2. “Correct” Detentions as Cost-Free
A second argument is that only erroneous detentions should count as
costs in the consequentialist calculus—that is, detention of those who
would not actually have committed the harm in question. Most of the
scholars who have considered preventive detention in cost-benefit terms
have assumed this proposition. If they are right, then it is appropriate to
discount the cost of detention by excluding “correct” detentions, the
detentions of those who would in fact have committed crime if not
detained.
The notion that errors are the relevant costs is familiar from the context
of criminal adjudication. The costs of concern there are wrongful
convictions and wrongful acquittals, Type I and Type II errors, and
insofar as we invoke cost-benefit analysis to inform our adjudication
structures we strive to weigh the relative costs of these errors. Jurists and
scholars have typically deemed a wrongful conviction to be much more
costly than a wrongful acquittal. Thus, Blackstone famously wrote that “it
is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”176
It is ten times worse, in other words, to wrongfully convict than to
wrongfully acquit. In statistical terms, a false positive is ten times as
costly as a false negative. This “cost ratio” translates loosely into the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.177 We require such proof
in order to minimize wrongful convictions, even at the cost of letting
additional guilty people go free.178
176

4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 352 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1769).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Because the standard
of proof affects the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the
choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world,
reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each.”); id. at 372 (“I view the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free.”); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (“The heavy
standard applied in criminal cases manifests our concern that the risk of error to the individual
must be minimized even at the risk that some who are guilty might go free.”).
178
To adhere to the Blackstone ratio exactly, we should calibrate our standard for conviction
such that it allows up to ten false negatives for each false positive. Precisely what degree of
statistical confidence in guilt this would require depends on the base rate of guilty versus
innocent people in the trial pool. The base rate will also affect “the actual ratio of errors” that
a 10:1 cost ratio produces. Nicholas Scurich & Richard John, The Normative Threshold for
177
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A direct translation of the Blackstone ratio to the preventive detention
context would also consider errors. Alan Dershowitz undertook such a
translation when he noted, in 1974, that “[t]here is no comparable
aphorism for preventive confinement” and asked what it might be: “[I]s
it better for X number of ‘false positives’ to be erroneously confined (and
for how long?) than for Y number of preventable harms (and of what
kind?) to occur? What relationship between X and Y does justice
require?”179 Other scholars have also assumed that errors are the relevant
costs to balance to determine when preventive detention is justified.180
But a focus on errors is inappropriate in the preventive context. A costsof-error framework makes sense for adjudications of guilt, where it is
permissible to discount the harm inflicted on a person who is accurately
convicted and punished because, at least in theory, that harm is deserved.
In the preventive detention context, by contrast, the harm inflicted on the
person detained is never justified by a finding of guilt. The determination
that justifies detention is an ex ante assessment of the likelihood of future
harm. And a person cannot be held responsible for possible future harm.
Thus, all preventive detention is costly, in the sense that the state makes
no claim that it is deserved. Every single instance of detention
subordinates the welfare of the detained person to the public good. There
is simply no conceptual basis to discount the welfare of those who, in a
hypothetical counterfactual universe, would have committed harm.181
Psychiatric Civil Commitment, 50 Jurimetrics J. 425, 438 (2010). It is important to note,
moreover, that this is not a universal interpretation of Blackstone’s principle. Some scholars,
including Professor Laurence Tribe, believe the point of the principle is to preclude rather than
to minimize false positives. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention, supra note 2, at 385–87.
179
Dershowitz, supra note 9, at 60 (“We have not even begun to ask these kinds of questions,
or to develop modes of analysis for answering them.”).
180
E.g., id.; John Monahan, Strategies for an Empirical Analysis of the Prediction of
Violence in Emergency Civil Commitment, 1 L. & Hum. Behav. 363, 370 (1977) (“[I]t may
be better that ten ‘false positives’ suffer commitment for three days than that one ‘false
negative’ go free to kill someone during that period.”); Scurich & John, supra note 178, at
431, 438–39 (interpreting Addington v. Texas to hold “that in the context of civil commitment
the cost of a false positive is greater than a false negative”; inferring the requirement for civil
commitment that false positives cannot outnumber false negatives; analyzing a dataset, and
concluding that only the highest-risk group that the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment tool
can identify, for whom the projected rate of violent crime is 52.7%, should be committed);
Vars, supra note 111, at 887–90 (treating “correct” detentions as having no cost relevant to a
cost-benefit analysis of detention).
181
The concept of a “false positive” is arguably not even coherent in the context of a
probabilistic assessment of risk. Whereas an adjudication of guilt is a factual determination
made ex post, preventive detention decisions require a probabilistic assessment of the
likelihood of future harm made ex ante. We can never know when we have “erroneously”
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3. Culpability for Risk
A related notion is that, even if the state cannot discount the value of
arrestees’ welfare on the basis of their counterfactual future guilt, it can
discount the liberty of those who pose a risk. The idea is that people are
generally responsible for whatever traits make them risky, and they are
culpable for having those traits or for failing to correct them.182 The
problem with this logic is that the traits that make someone high-risk may
be entirely beyond a person’s control. As a statistical matter, for instance,
age and gender are among the most powerful predictors of future criminal
activity.183 Teenage men are the highest-risk demographic across time and
national boundaries.184 Even assuming that some people are responsible
for some of the facts that render them risky, like gang involvement,
invoking that responsibility as grounds for discounting their welfare
raises a difficult due process question: Is it permissible for the state to
invoke a person’s culpability for past acts as grounds for discounting their
welfare, without a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and rigorous
adversarial process? That question brings us to the most obvious ground
for discounting the welfare of arrestees relative to crime victims and the
ground that is most difficult to resolve.
4. Culpability for Past Conduct
Barring unlawful arrests, there is probable cause to believe that every
arrestee is guilty of a crime. As between a person for whom there is
probable cause to believe her guilty of a crime and a person for whom
there is no such cause, it is a human tendency to privilege the well-being
of the latter. The arrested person (probably) did something wrong! Her

detained someone, because we can never know what that person would have done had she not
been detained. Even if we could know that she would have committed no harm, it is not clear
that the detention was “in error” if the risk was great enough. See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In,
Bias Out, 128 Yale L.J. 2218, 2244 (2019) (“If an event assessed as likely does not transpire,
it does not render the initial probabilistic assessment ‘false.’ ”). Finally, at a metaphysical
level, unless one believes that the future is wholly determined (excluding even quantum
indeterminacy), the problem with holding someone accountable for crime they would have
committed in a counterfactual universe is not just epistemic but ontological: there is no truth
of the matter about what would have happened under counterfactual conditions.
182
See Husak, supra note 165, at 1193–94.
183
See, e.g., Stevenson & Slobogin, supra note 158, at 689–700.
184
Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 Am. J.
Soc. 552, 556 fig.1 (1983).
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liberty does not deserve the same protection as the liberty of a wholly
innocent person.
The problem with this rationale is that it involves differential treatment
on the basis of guilt, or possible guilt, prior to a criminal conviction. One
of us has evaluated this rationale for discounting arrestees’ welfare in a
prior article, Dangerous Defendants.185 As that article notes, private
citizens may be justified in treating accused persons with less concern
than potential crime victims, but the government is in a different position.
Due process prohibits the government from subjecting a person “to the
stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to the possibility
of institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him.”186 This
is because such judgments inflict profound and unique expressive harm.
“Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every
individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when
there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”187
It is the difficulty of assessing guilt fairly that creates a “pretrial” phase
in the first place. The entirety of the procedural regime that governs
criminal proceedings is designed to prevent the state from lending its
power to casual, arbitrary, vindictive, or incorrect judgments of guilt.188
Given the importance of these protections, the possible guilt of pretrial
detainees is, at best, a dubious ground for discounting the value of their
liberty before trial.
The argument against taking culpability into account is not watertight,
however. At least one Supreme Court opinion has deemed a person’s
185
See Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 537–41 (developing this point in
more depth).
186
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970); see also id. at 361–63 (holding that only proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict). Cf. Ferzan, Preventive Justice, supra note
79, at 508–09, 523 (arguing that a state may preventively restrain “[c]ulpable [a]ggressors”
but should be required to prove culpability beyond a reasonable doubt).
187
In reWinship, 397 U.S. at 363–64. As Winship itself demonstrates, the Constitution
demands this protection even for civil proceedings that trigger (purportedly) non-punitive
consequences only. Id. at 365–67 (explaining that “civil labels and good intentions do not
themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts”). See also,
e.g., Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (stating that probable cause
“means less than evidence which would justify condemnation”); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (noting that the function of the probable cause determination is “to
safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded
charges of crime”).
188
In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362–63; see also infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text
(asserting that a defendant’s “presumption of innocence” is fundamental to criminal legal
proceedings).
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apparent culpability for creating a risk to be relevant to how his interests
should be weighed. In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court considered
whether Scott, a police officer, violated the Fourth Amendment by using
a “PIT maneuver” to run Harris’ car off the road after Harris fled a traffic
stop, leaving Harris a quadriplegic.189 Writing for an eight-justice
majority, Justice Scalia explained that the reasonableness of a seizure for
Fourth Amendment purposes is a matter of interest-balancing.190 In
Scott’s case, Scalia reasoned, it was appropriate “to take into account not
only the number of lives at risk, but also their relative culpability.”191
Since Harris had “intentionally placed himself and the public in danger
by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight” his welfare was
entitled to less weight than that of innocent people he had put at risk.192
The Court held that Officer Scott was entitled to summary judgment
because his conduct was reasonable as a matter of law.
There are reasons not to accord too much weight to the culpability
language in Scott. It is arguably dicta. The Court’s assessment of the
parties’ relative culpability is questionable; there is a plausible argument
that Scott and the other officers who chased Harris were the ones who
created the unnecessary risk.193 Finally, Scott might have it wrong. It is
far from clear that police officers should be weighing moral responsibility
to make split-second decisions about whether to use deadly force, or that
the constitutionality of that force should be contingent on the moral status
of the person they hurt or kill.194
189

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374–75, 375 n.1 (2007).
Id. at 383 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
191
Id. at 384.
192
Id.
193
The record is somewhat unclear, but presumably the officers had Harris’ license plate
number and could have tracked him down after the fact rather than chasing him immediately.
Id. at 393.
194
Prior to Scott, the Court’s seminal opinion on police use of deadly force to stop a fleeing
suspect was Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). In that case, too, the Court engaged in
interest balancing. The Court reasoned, for instance, that “[i]t is not better that all felony
suspects die than that they escape.” Id. at 11. The Court ultimately held that the Fourth
Amendment permits “the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed
suspected felon” only when “it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable
cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury
to the officer or others.” Id. at 3. The Court did not suggest that, by attempting to flee or by
having (probably) committed a recent crime, a suspect diminished his own right to liberty or
the weight that should be afforded to it in the balance. Id. at 10–11. To the contrary, with
respect to Garner’s personal interests, the Court merely said: “The suspect’s fundamental
interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon.” Id. at 9.
190
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Yet Scalia’s abstract point is hard to dismiss. It seems unjust to ask a
potential victim to bear as much of a burden as a person we have good
reason to believe has culpably created a risk.195 Even progressive bail
reform strategies seem tied to ideas of desert. Many bail reform advocates,
for instance, would limit eligibility for pretrial detention to those charged
with serious offenses on strong evidence.196 Most people see pretrial
detention as particularly unjust when charges are eventually dropped.197
If the ground for detention is risk, this focus on the charge is misplaced.
Except in edge cases, like the hypothetical arrestee who credibly threatens
imminent harm, current charges tend to provide little information about
the likelihood of future criminal conduct. Many pretrial risk assessment
tools do not even include the current charges as a risk factor. Reform
strategies focused heavily on the charged offense may be motivated in
part by the sense that people charged with minor crimes or charged on
weak evidence do not deserve to be incarcerated before trial.198
The sense that culpability should inform pretrial detention practice is
eminently understandable. No one likes the idea of detention on grounds
of risk alone.199 And it is hard to shake the feeling that “bad” people
should be stopped from hurting “good” people. Did you worry about
Harvey Weinstein being stuck in jail? On an emotional level, we cannot
help but feel that some people deserve to be subject to heightened
restraint, presumption of innocence be damned.
At the start of this Article, we assumed that this kind of reasoning
would run afoul of the constitutional prohibition on pretrial punishment,
but the reality is more complex. On one plausible definition of
punishment, the feature that distinguishes it from other forms of hard
195

See, e.g., Ferzan, Preventive Justice, supra note 79, at 508–09 (arguing that some acts of
preventive interference by the state can be justified in the same way that self-defense is
justified against “[c]ulpable [a]ggressors”).
196
See sources cited supra notes 49–55 (model pretrial release and detention schemes).
197
Starger, supra note 171 (using an “original dataset of over 150,000 Maryland District
Court cases” to show that “every year thousands of accused persons are routinely jailed for
extended periods on charges that are ultimately dropped”).
198
The alternate motivation for limiting pretrial detention by certain charge-based
constraints is simply to ensure some categorical limits on detention, as American bail law has
historically done. Mayson, Detention by Any Other Name, supra note 24, at 1649–52
(describing the historical right to bail in state law).
199
But see Mayson, Consequentialist Framework, supra note 81 (manuscript at 3, 14)
(arguing that a frank consequentialist approach to preventive state coercion might be more
liberty-protective than the deontological approach that current dominates theory and
jurisprudence).
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treatment is that punishment is inflicted in order to convey moral censure,
and it is thus inflicted because of, rather than in spite of, the suffering it
entails.200 If one adopts this view, discounting the value of an arrestee’s
welfare on the basis of apparent culpability does not, alone, amount to
punishment. The government can accord her welfare less value in a costbenefit analysis with no specific intent to convey moral censure. It will
regret having to detain her, locking her up despite, rather than because of,
what she will suffer. We could conceivably design a pretrial detention
regime where a preliminary judgment of culpability is necessary to
authorize detention, and detention is limited by the degree of apparent
guilt. Whether such detention would constitute “punishment” is an open
question, both in terms of theory and in terms of constitutional doctrine.
This Article cannot resolve the question of whether the government
should be permitted to discount the value of arrestees’ welfare, relative to
potential crime victims, on the basis of their apparent culpability for
charged conduct. But we urge caution. American law has built an
elaborate procedural edifice to protect against unwarranted governmental
judgments of guilt. We have a system for punishing Harvey Weinstein:
criminal sentencing. It happens after conviction for good reason.
Retributivism and consequentialism will always co-exist awkwardly in
the criminal justice system. However, the current scale of pretrial
incarceration suggests that the retributive impulse has been running
without check in an environment in which it should be, at most, an
occasional and suspect guest.
C. Implications for Bail Reform
In theory, bail determinations are relatively straightforward.
Magistrates are supposed to evaluate any relevant risk that defendants
pose and determine how to mitigate it in the least restrictive way possible.
The challenges of this task are largely technical. It demands skills in
prediction as well as knowledge about what type of interventions best
mitigate risk for defendants with different needs. It is not supposed to

200
E.g., Mitchell N. Berman, The Justification of Punishment, in The Routledge Companion
to Philosophy of Law 141, 143 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012) (defining punishment as infliction
of hard treatment “because of, and not despite” the suffering it will cause); Douglas Husak,
supra note 165, at 1189 (“[A] sanction is not a punishment without a purpose to deprive and
censure.”); Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 539–40, 539 n.234.
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entail the evaluation of culpability or worth. The perception of the bail
hearing as largely administrative helps to explain its lack of procedural
protections. Bail hearings tend to be brief, often only one or two minutes.
Many jurisdictions do not recognize a right to counsel for the accused.
Bail magistrates may not even be lawyers, let alone judges. In the judicial
hierarchy, bail magistrates live near the bottom.
This Article suggests, however, that bail magistrates are not engaged
in a straightforward cost-benefit analysis. Perhaps their decisions are
influenced by their perception of arrestees’ culpability or worth. Or
perhaps they are simply responding to structural incentives and detaining
individuals who pose any risk to avoid being excoriated in a front-page
news story for having released someone who then commits a terrible
crime.201 Whatever the mechanisms at work, bail magistrates seem to be
engaged in a mental and moral calculus outside of a technical evaluation
of risk.202
The disconnect between theory and practice may shed light on why
certain reform strategies have faltered. If the bail decision is purely
consequentialist, then adopting tools that aid bail magistrates in predicting
reoffending, like actuarial risk assessment tools, should be a no-brainer.
But magistrates’ response to risk assessment algorithms has been
lukewarm.203 They ignore the recommendations associated with the risk
assessment more often than not, and use fades over time.204 The usual
explanation is that judges are irrationally distrustful of the technology, or
overly confident in their ability to predict. If the bail determination is not
primarily an evaluation of risk, on the other hand, the problem may be
that the technology doesn’t match the task as magistrates perceive it.
201
See, e.g., Aurélie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: The
Influence of Prosecutors 3 (Apr. 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (explaining how magistrates
are incentivized to err on the side of being unnecessarily harsh on a defendant who would not
have reoffended; arguing that “magistrates will tend to set bail higher than is necessary to
ensure good conduct” since type II errors are more salient than type I errors); W. David
Ball, The Peter Parker Problem, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 879, 886–87 (2020) (arguing that people
tend to perceive an action taken (“abnormal”) as more salient than inaction (“normal”), so
pretrial detention’s default status—where release is perceived as action rather than inaction—
exacerbates judges’ concerns).
202
See also Sandra G. Mayson, After Money Bail: Lifting the Veil on Pretrial Detention,
Law & Pol. Econ. Project Blog (Feb. 15, 2020), https://lpeproject.org/blog/after-money-baillifting-the-veil-on-pretrial-detention [https://perma.cc/9YBZ-WCAQ] (“[W]e have been
using money bail, and the detention it produces, to meet a host of social needs.”).
203
Stevenson, supra note 147, at 373 (reporting that judges deviated from the
recommendations associated with the risk assessment more often than not).
204
Id. at 308–09.
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Recognizing that judgments of desert—conscious or unconscious—
may play a role in bail determinations also helps to illuminate certain
hazards for reform. Bail scholarship, for instance, has tended to assume
that magistrates are engaged in a consequentialist cost-benefit analysis.205
This assumption influences how empirical results are interpreted, as well
as what policy changes seem sensible. For instance, one prominent paper
has attributed racial disparity in bail decisions to prediction errors: a belief
that Black defendants pose a higher crime risk than they actually do.206
The authors infer that we can reduce disparity by improving prediction,
either through the use of risk assessment tools or through experience and
training.207 If the bail decision is not primarily a consequentialist one, both
the diagnosis of the problem and the proposed solution are less likely to
be correct.
Bail reformers, meanwhile, face a difficult question about whether to
insist on consequentialist principles or to embrace some retributive
criterion for pretrial detention. On the one hand, a pure cost-benefit
approach is the cleanest. Discounting the well-being of arrestees prior to
conviction is anathema to liberal values. As our analysis suggests,
moreover, strict adherence to consequentialist principles should produce
extremely low rates of pretrial detention. On the other hand, pure
consequentialism can be a bitter pill to swallow. Many advocates recoil
at the idea of considering demographic factors (like age, gender,
neighborhood characteristics, etc.) in a risk assessment, even if such
factors are relevant to the risk of future crime. Rejecting the inclusion of
non-culpable factors in the evaluation of risk is an implicit endorsement
of the principle that culpability is relevant to restrictions on pretrial
liberty.
Finally, reformers must reckon with the human impulse to evaluate
culpability and worth when determining whom to detain and whom to
release. Whether or not the law permits bail magistrates to discount the
well-being of arrestees in the risk calculus, human beings are inclined to
do so. This is happening regardless of our formal disapproval. Bail
magistrates are engaging in a complex, messy, and fraught determination
205
See, e.g., Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q.J. Econ. 237, 239 (2018);
David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J. Econ.
1885, 1887 (2018).
206
Arnold, Dobbie & Yang, supra note 205, at 1889–90.
207
Id. at 1929.
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that melds risk and worth, with liberty in the balance. If we decide that
culpability is relevant to bail determinations, those determinations will
require clear guidance and much greater care.208 Assembly-line hearings
are not appropriate to official determinations of desert. Conversely, to the
extent that determinations of pretrial liberty should adhere to strictly
consequentialist criteria, the realities of human psychology mean that we
will need to alter the incentive structure for magistrates and implement
structural constraints on detention that can withstand pressure over time.
CONCLUSION
Purely preventive detention is a fixture of governance. Yet despite
hundreds of years of practice, the law provides little guidance about what
type and degree of risk justifies a complete deprivation of liberty. This
lack of guidance has become more salient with the spread of pretrial risk
assessment, because a jurisdiction that adopts statistical tools must
explicitly decide what risk-threshold divides those who may warrant
preventive detention from those who do not.
This Article has offered an analytical framework for deriving a riskthreshold for pretrial preventive detention and an empirical method to
implement it. Our results demonstrate a profound disconnect between
theory and practice. If bail courts were faithfully employing the
consequentialist principles entailed by constitutional doctrine, pretrial
detention on the basis of dangerousness would be exceedingly rare.
Instead, it is exceedingly common. Consequentialism may be the stated
rationale for depriving people of pretrial liberty, but it is not the governing
force behind daily practice.
Consequentialist interest balancing is the rationale for preventive
detention in other arenas as well. Whenever a person is detained in whole
or in part to prevent future harm, there must be some tradeoff between the
harm averted and the harm imposed.209 The framework and tools
208
See Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 10, at 540–41 (pointing out a multitude
of unanswered questions in allowing probable guilt to justify preventive restraint).
209
Things get complicated when the state claims that the detention is deserved or that the
detainee had a limited right to liberty in the first place. The conceptual framework developed
here therefore does not apply cleanly to punitive incapacitation, juvenile detention, or
immigration detention. To develop a coherent justification framework in such circumstances,
one must establish what exactly the detainee deserves and how desert relates to utilitarian
benefit as a justification for detention, or, in the case of limited a priori liberty rights, how to
weigh the detainee’s liberty interest in a cost-benefit calculus. See, e.g., Douglas Husak,
Retributive Desert and Deterrence: How Both Cohere in a Single Justification of Punishment,
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developed in this Article apply directly to settings where the state detains
individuals with no claim that detention is deserved, including material
witness detention, involuntary commitment, quarantine, and wartime
detention of citizens. The particular judgments from our jail-versus-crime
survey translate best to other forms of detention to prevent intentional
future harm: sex offender commitment, material witness detention, and,
loosely, traditional civil commitment.
Perhaps in other preventive detention settings there will be a closer
accord between theory and practice. But without interrogating the nature
and degree of risk that justifies a particular deprivation of liberty, we
cannot know. The state’s authority to deprive a person of freedom on the
basis of potential future harm is one of its most fearsome powers. Unless
we are willing to confront the difficult tradeoffs that preventive detention
requires, we risk the possibility that vague consequentialist reasoning will
serve to cloak other, and uglier, forces.
APPENDIX A
The two tables below show a sample of responses from the serious
assault survey. The first table shows the first ten responses that were
dropped from the analysis because a research assistant flagged them as
failing our attention checks. In some, the respondent has included
unresponsive text that was likely copied from the internet. Alternatively,
the respondent might be a bot using text analysis to complete the survey.
In some, the person answered one or two questions in good faith, but
subsequent responses were nonsensical, blank, or only tangentially
related to the question. The second table shows the first ten responses that
were included in the analysis for serious assault. For each table, the first
two columns show answers to the initial priming questions, the third and
fourth columns show responses to the core open-answer question, and the
final column shows the respondent’s explanation for their answer.

in The Routledge Handbook of Criminal Justice Ethics 113, 114–17 (Jonathan Jacobs &
Jonathan Jackson eds., 2017).
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Examples of Dropped Responses
Difficulties of jail
In examining this
topic, we
reviewed research
and scholarship
from
criminology, law,
penology ...
Prisons in the
United States are
for the most part
remote, closed ...
Although
individual prisons
can vary widely
in their nature and
effects, a ... the
prison yard,
reducing the time
prisoners could
spend watching
television,
placing ...
READ BOOKS
DO SOME
PHYSICAL
WORKS
JAIL IS THE
DIFICULT
PLACE

I LOVE VERY
MUCH
boring time,
cleanness, beaten,
mental torture.

Difficulties of
serious assault
In order to call a
death a homicide,
we must find the
following facts to
be true: ... Suppose
that a police officer
lawfully orders a
fleeing felon to
halt, but that the
felon ... or
resistance by the
victim, such as
robbery, rape, or
aggravated
assault), that ... is
sufficient under
Indiana law to
constitute an
attempt to commit
an offense.
ALWAYS HAVE
A KNIFE
WHAT EVER
INFORM TO THE
NEAR BY
POLICE
STATION
ALWAYS HAVE
SOS
MESSAGING
SYSTEM
GOOD VERY
LIKE
finger print,
forgotten things,
weapons, dress,

Crime-equivalent
jail time
1000 Month(s)

20

Explanation
NICE

Day(s)

FOR DOING
SOME THEFT
IN THE SHOP

3

Month(s)

3

Month(s)

GOOD VERY
LIKE
some of the land
problem in near
my relatives.
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The hardest thing
about being in
prison is not the
time the judge
gives you, but ...
a man who was
incarcerated at 22
and has spent the
last 30 years in
prison. ... I had no
idea how much
pain I would be
forced to carry
alone.

All right from pre
task, we're gonna
be in this
mechanical room
walking through
it not working in
it. So right away
there is a, there is
a safety hazard
right away or
safety concern.
We've got a big,
big step right here
that we got to go
over and then the
piping. Once we
get to the pipe
over the piping
was over that
ladder. And we're
gonna be working
on this chiller
right here. Other

Virginia Law Review
characteristics, a
victim's ability to
cope with the
impact of crime
depends on a
variety ...
Generally, violent
crime victims have
a more difficult
time coping than
property ...
Become familiar
with the culture
and traditions of
the populations
being served. ... or
child sexual
assault, as well as
observing the
serious injury or
death
All right from pre
task, we're gonna
be in this
mechanical room
walking through it
not working in it.
So right away there
is a, there is a
safety hazard right
away or safety
concern. We've got
a big, big step right
here that we got to
go over and then
the piping. Once
we get to the pipe
over the piping
was over that
ladder. And we're
gonna be working
on this chiller right
here. Other than
that, I mean there's

[Vol. 108:709

96

Week(s)

ok good

10

Month(s)

All right from
pre task, we're
gonna be in this
mechanical
room walking
through it not
working in it. So
right away there
is a, there is a
safety hazard
right away or
safety concern.
We've got a big,
big step right
here that we got
to go over and
then the piping.
Once we get to
the pipe over the
piping was over
that ladder. And
we're gonna be
working on this
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than that, I mean
there's really
nothing else. Be
careful with.
There's water. It's
wet out here.

really nothing else.
Be careful with.
There's water. It's
wet out here.

chiller right
here. Other than
that, I mean
there's really
nothing else. Be
careful with.
There's water.
It's wet out here.
1000

Good

good

feel very bad in
jail because that
place is not in
freedom
i don't told
anything for my
nation

robbery

i think first save
my nation next
save other member
after me saving

777

10000

Month(s)
Year(s)

Good

1

Month(s)

the assault is
very dangerous
to try it

5

Year(s)

long time i need
for my nation

Examples of Included Responses
Difficulties of jail

Difficulties of serious
assault

Not being able to
smoke. Losing my
job. Being lonely.
Being scared.
Losing all freedom.
Being away from
my kids, money for
extra food or phone
calls, no privacy,
dealing with other
inmates all the
time.

Traumatic stress.
Nightmares. Never
trusting anyone again.
Being jumpy all the
time.
Healing, explaining to
people what happened,
having to relive the
attack, possible
nightmares, medical
expenses

Crimeequivalent jail
time
1 Day(s)

Explanation of
answer

2

Assult i would
heal within
that time i
think

Week(s)

I could do one
day easily.
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The gross food
Missing my cats
No alone time
Being trapped in a
cell

Trouble sleeping
Trouble trusting people
Living in fear
Physical scars/damage

6

Month(s)

no freedom
not being able to
make choices
being around so
many different
people
not seeing family

not feeling safe
having to retell the
story multiple times to
law enforcement
memories/flashbacks
nightmares

6

Month(s)

1. Fear of inability
to assimilate to jail
life
2. Lack of respect
of inmates towards
one another
3. Spiral into a life
of further crime
and/or more jail
time
4. Removed from
society, family, and
friends
isolation
panic
anxiety
fear
loneliness

1. Fear of a second
attack from any
stranger you encounter
2. Lack of trust in
society and people in
general overall
3. Inability to do
certain activities like be
alone or out at night
4. Memory of the
attack living in your
mind forever

5

Day(s)

Trauma
nightmares
ptsd
loss of security
fear

1

Month(s)

I think being
in jail for 6
mos would
start to impact
you mentally
and would
stay with you
for a while.
The same
goes for an
assault. It
would be hard
to move past
it.
I value time
with my
family to the
point that I
would rather
survive an
assault than to
have time
away from
them.
I feel like
jailtime
screws up
your
professional
life and
career, while
the equivalent
assault screws
up your
personal and
emotional life.
the isolation
and loneliness
of being in jail
would become
unbearable
after 1 month
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Communal living
conditions. Time
alone. Regimented
activities.
Surveillance.
Intimidation of
peers and guards.
Time apart from
loved ones. Lost
time.
Lack of sleep
Sharing space with
strangers
Bad Food
Not seeing family
and friends

Physical problems.
Loss of productive
time. Fear of it
happening again.

5

Month(s)

Thinking it's going to
happen again
Pain
Ongoing medical issues
Fear of going out

6

Month(s)

The embarrassment
would be a huge
factor. That and the
record that comes
with being in jail.
Court costs would
hurt. Losing my
job would be a big
deal as well

The physical fear
afterwards of it being
able to happen at any
time again. The fear
that people are out
there... waiting to hurt
you. Hurt anyone.
Willing to kill you for
whatever you got.
Willing to hurt you
because you disagree
with them or have
something they don't
have.
It would be extremely
traumatizing. I would
have to deal with that
and also paranoia. I
would live with the
mental scars of it all.
Additionally, the

1

Year(s)

1

Year(s)

Not seeing family,
having a poor diet,
going mentally
insane, and being
scared of others.

779
Three months
can go by
pretty quick, 4
is borderline
but 5 is kind
of long, it
depends on
how much
injury is
involved.
If you were
going to
recover
eventually, 6
months is
probably
when you
would recover
mostly. So I
think that is
fairly
equivalent.
I don't want to
be hurt

This was
tough so I
went with an
arbitrary
period of time.
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physical pain endured
would be tough.

APPENDIX B
Rearrest rates in validation studies might understate the number of
crimes that the highest risk groups would actually commit because
validation studies suffer from selection bias. We only see the pretrial
rearrest rate for people who are not detained, and detained defendants may
pose a higher crime risk than those who are released.
It is impossible to know the severity of selection bias, but we can
assume the worst and see how it affects the analysis. Let us assume that
50% of high-risk defendants are detained (a realistic assumption),210 and
that every single one of them would otherwise be arrested for a violent
crime within a month (an extraordinarily unrealistic assumption). Finally,
assume that the violent-arrest rate for released high-risk defendants is
2.5% within a month, as in the COMPAS study, which reported the
highest recidivism rates among available studies. On these assumptions,
a high-risk classification corresponds to a 51.25% chance of violent
rearrest within a month, absent detention.211 Even this probability of
violence does not meet the survey-based risk threshold. Detaining a
thousand people who pose this degree of risk, for one month each, is
projected to avert 512.5 violent offenses. But according to our surveybased standard, one thousand months of detention would have to avert the
equivalent of 1000 serious assaults to be cost-justified.212 A 51.25%
chance of violent rearrest within fifteen days might justify fifteen days of

210

None of the validation studies discussed here reports the release rate for the highest-risk
group. But in data used by one of us in a separate paper, 50% of defendants flagged as high
risk for violence by the PSA were detained throughout the pretrial process. Stevenson, supra
note 147, at 354.
211
All of the detained defendants (100% of 50%) in addition to 2.5% of the released
defendants (2.5% of the other 50%) would be rearrested for a violent offense; equivalently
(0.5*1) + (0.5*0.025) = 0.5125, or 51.25%, of all defendants.
212
Given that the average “violent offense” is likely to be less grave than serious assault, it
is unlikely that offense severity makes up the difference. See supra note 154.
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detention.213 But even on extreme assumptions about selection bias,
contemporary risk assessment tools do not appear capable of identifying
crime-risk sufficient to justify typical preventive detention.214
There is, however, a second reason that the rearrest rate of high-risk
defendants might understate the riskiness of that group: not all crimes
result in arrest. Table 3 shows 2017 estimates of the national number of
arrests and crime victimizations for robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
and simple assault.215 The final column shows the crime-to-arrest rate for
each offense.
Table 3: National Arrest Versus Crime-Victimization Rates

Robbery
Ag. Assault
Burglary
Simple Assault

Arrests

Crimes

94,046
388,927
199,266
1,062,370

613,837
993,173
2,538,165
3,611,678

Crimes per
arrest
6.53
2.55
12.74
3.4

We can account for this concern by using the crime-to-arrest ratio to
“scale up” the rearrest rates reported in the risk assessment validation
studies. A violent-rearrest rate of 2.5% within a month implies that for
every thousand people released, twenty-five will be rearrested for
violence within thirty days. Detaining one thousand such people for a
month, conversely, is projected to avert twenty-five violent rearrests. The
highest crime-to-arrest rate in Table 3 is 12.74, for burglary. Applying
this very conservative ratio, we assume that averting twenty-five arrests
means averting 318 crimes. Yet even if all 318 crimes were for serious
assault—an unlikely assumption216—this still would be far too low a
213
Note that even if 99% of the highest-risk group would commit serious assault within a
month if released, a month of preventive detention would still not be warranted. Our survey
respondents saw 100 months of lost liberty as a greater cost than 99 assaults.
214
If 90% of the high-risk defendants were detained, the average violent rearrest rate would
be 90.25% (.9*1+.1*.025)—still too low.
215
Arrest rates are nationally representative estimates from the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reports. See Crime in the United States 2017, supra note 154, at tbl.29. Crime victimization
rates are nationally representative estimates from the National Crime Victimization Survey
(“NCVS”). See Rachel E. Morgan & Jennifer L. Truman, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Criminal Victimization, 2017, 1, 3–4 (2018), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9UR-7T7Q].
216
See supra note 154.
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number to justify preventive detention using our survey-based standard.
To justify the detention of a thousand people for one month each, we
would have to prevent the equivalent of at least 1000 serious assaults, not
318.
If one were to combine all of our extremely conservative assumptions
at once, pretrial detention might be justified for the highest-risk category.
However, we expect that these assumptions are much too conservative—
under a more realistic combination of assumptions, we think it is highly
unlikely that the highest-risk category of defendants pose a risk that would
warrant preventive detention.

